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ABSTRACT
The rDzogs-chen thinkers of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition are unique 
in presenting a highly developed account of mind and intelligence that 
remains grounded in experience while avoiding the pitfalls of reductionism. 
This study focuses on a distinction, important for understanding the rDzogs­
chen contribution. between mentation (Kml) and excitatory intelligence 
(rig-pa), Mentation refers to the non-optimal operations in which the 
experiential field becomes structured into the subjective grasping of projects 
that elicit interest. It is marked by the repetition of habitual patterns and 
by a di mming of the cognitive potential. Excitatory intelligence, on the other 
hand, involves an optimizing energy that restores the fluidity to experience. 
Here the dynamics of evolutionary change are accessed. To set the stage for 
a discussion of the rDzogs-chen contributions to the understanding of mind, 
an account of the philosophical debate amongst the Buddhist schools of 
philosophy is first presented. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCIION 
This thesis presents a study of the insights of a little-known tradition 
of Tibetan Buddhism concerning mind and experience. A striking feature of 
current research, both in the humanities and sciences, is the breakdown of 
the traditional account of mind and the resulting uncertainty regarding the 
role of experience within nature. Experience is commonty conceptualized as 
something that occurs within the mind. Experience is always experience "of"; 
either experience of the objects thought to make up the world or experience 
of physiological processes occurring within the body. How is mind and 
ultimately experience to be related to the "objects" that are experienced? 
The philosophical literature shows the myriad of problems this mind/body 
dualism presents. In this context a study of the insights of the rDzogs-chen 
tradition is presented. This tradition offers a novel perspective on the 
problem of mind and experience from a perspective independent of the 
"Western" philosophical tradition. 
In contrast to many of the modern solutions that address the problem 
of mind/body dualism by incorporating mind and experience within a 
materialistic framework t rDzogs-chen maintained a position that rejected 
both the materialistic and idealist extremes.rDzogs-chen thinking can be 
characterized by a focus on experience and a concerted opposition to any 
form of reductionism. The use of the term "experience" will have to be 
clarified in the next chapter. As will be shown, experience is usually judged 
to be an internal experience of some-1hing. In contrast, rDzogs-chen 
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thinkers focused on "how" experience operates as a dynamic process. 
According to the commonly accepted view, minds are thought to have 
experience which is "of" or about objects that are separate and outside of the 
mind. Buddhist philosophers carefully refuted a variety of theses that 
suggest objects have independent existence. Objects are regarded as only a 
concretization out of the experiential field occurring as the result of 
operations that move away from originary experience. 
rDzogs-chen thinkers would consider the dualistic model as a valid 
description of a certain limited domain of operations. The model describes 
what might be called "ordinary" operations within experience. These 
ordinary operations are understood in terms of the attachments and 
aversions to various projects that are assumed to have a "rear status. 
According to the rDzogs- chen tradition, the "ordinary" operations of mind 
are the result of a dividing up of the wider experiential field. Experience 
actually is prior to the splitting of the experiential field into objective and 
subjective components. Any model of mind which is based upon the 
ordinary dualistic operations fails to include the wider experiential field and 
is therefore incomplete. According to the rDzogs-chen viewpoint, the 
com monly accepted model of mind only describes the relatively low levels of 
mental operations (RJDlJ and is derivative from the wider experiential field, 
which. it is claimed, can be accessed thereby restoring the openness and 
freedom of experience. rDzogs-chen thinkers suggested that it is of 
particular importance to fully comprehend the distinction between low level 
operations and intensified excitatory intelligence (rig-ga). Excitatory 
inteHigence reflects the full range of the dynamics of experience which is 
free from the concretizing and grasping of ordinary intelligence. Excitatory 
intelligence is the energizing thrust that allows beings to transcend their 
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limited structure cycles and emerge into new dynamic regimes of 
meaningfulness. The distinction between the low level operation termed 
"mentation" (Rml) and the optimal excitatory intelligence (rig- pal is a 
unique contribution of rDzogs-chen thinking and shows how rDzogs-chen 
thinking went beyond the results of other Buddhist traditions. 
The introductory chapter wiH discuss the historical situatedness of the 
rDzogs-chen tradition and suggest some of the distinguishing characteristics 
of the rDzogs-chen approach of Buddhism. The particular focus of our 
investigations is a text composed by 'jigs-med gling-pa, the Yon-tanmdzod 1, 
which presents an overview of the Buddhist search for meaningful being. 
The introductory chapter will conclude with a discussion of the problems 
inherent in translating and understanding Buddhist texts. It is significant 
that in the field of Buddhist studies there have been many translations of 
texts yet. to my knowledge. there is only one study that addresses the 
problem of translation.2 This discussion will defend the choice of a 
'hermeneutic" approach. 
3
A) Setting of the Problem 
Western scholars of Buddhism have widely assumed that Tibetans 
were primarily passive recipients of ideas that originated elsewhere. Early 
study of Tibetan texts was motivated by an interest in translations of 
Sanskrit texts no longer available in the original. This focus. combined with 
the insistence from the Tibetan theocracy on "authenticity" (which meant 
that all "authoritative" texts had to be traced back to an Indian original) has 
resulted in a one-sided view of indigenous contributions. No less an 
authority than Giuseppe Tucci has declared: 
The (Indian) pattern (Tibetans) willfully 
choose and follow with ruthless discipline 
allows them no freedom of choice, no sally or 
brainwave: everything is calculated, 
measured, dosed in such a fashion, that all 
sparks of genius, had there been any, would 
have been dampened and smothered.3 
A closer examination of the voluminous literature of Tibet shows that this is 
not the case. Instead ""ope find texts demonstrating that Tibetan authors 
responded to the stimulation of Buddhist ideas in a sensitive and creative 
manner producing literature that had no parallel in "origina1" sources. 
The rDzogs-chen school of Tibetan Buddhism was particularly 
innovative in developing a holistic, process approach to central questions of 
being and intelligence. rDzogs-chen thinking can be traced to the earliest 
contacts of Buddhism with Tibet. According to traditional authority the first 
diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet was associated with King Srong-bstan-sgam­
po (died 649), who dispatched his minister Thon-mi-sambhota to Kashmir in 
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632 to study Sanskrit grammar in order to create a written language and 
grammar for Tibet4. However there is evidence to suggest that the date of 
the first Tibetan encounter with Buddhism can be traced back much earlier. 
While these dates cannot be fixed with much accuracy. rDzogs-chen thinking 
traces its history back to a person named Sri Singha who lived at least 300 
years earlier than the official dates of the first diffusionS. Indeed the first 
person associated with the rDzogs- chen tradition was dGa'-rab rdo-rje who 
may have lived as early as S2 A.D.6 
The rDzogs-chen tradition is usually considered to be part of the 
rNying-ma or "ancient" lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. The term rNying-ma 
only arose after what is termed the .'second" diffusion of Buddhism during 
which Atisa. who came to Tibet in 1042, instituted a series of reforms.7 
These reforms placed a greater emphasis on monastic discipline and 
adherence to the logic and epistemology based elements of the Indian 
tradition. Atisa's reforms left the ontologically oriented Vajrayana teachings 
for only a select few. In addition, a kind of fundamentalism arose that 
suggested that only Indian texts contained the authentic teachings of 
Buddhism, and resulted in the strange practice of concocting "Sanskrit" titles 
for indigenous texts. adding to the confusion concerning Tibetan literature. 
In the eleventh century the translator Rin-chen bzang-po instituted a new 
method of interpreting and translating Sanskrit texts, which was intended to 
standardize texts and come closer to the originals. With this new approach 
came a tendency to ignore and even sometimes suppress the "old" schoot 
which was accused of deviating from the "original" teachings. 
While rDzogs-chen thinkers were often associated with rNying-ma 
monasteries and centers of learning (see Figure 1), it is perhaps more 
accurate to say that the life of rDzogs-chen thinking continued in individuals 
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who kept alive a questioning process in which meaning was not reduced to a 
set of texts or doctrinal tenets that were fixed and passed down to later 
generations. It is perhaps because of its "unsettling" effect that rDzogs-chen 
thinking did not lend itself to institutionalization. Klong-chen rab- 'byams­
pa, perhaps the most encompassing and original of the rDzogs-chen thinkers. 
gave up monastic life and preferred to keep to himself and his work. In 
addition rDzogs-chen philosophy had a non-sectarian quality such that even 
great dGe-lugs-pa masters of the "new" traditions such as the Fifth Dalai 
Lama declared themselves to be adherents. This non-sectarian approach was 
emphasized by the Eclectic movement of the 19th century by 'jam-dbyangs 
mkhyen-brtse (1820- 1892) and Kong-sprul Yon-tan rgya-mtsho (1811­
1899 ).8 In general we might say that rDzogs-chen thinkers were not content 
to merely imitate or repeat what they heard, but rather approached the 
Buddhist impetus as a challenging presence that elicits a response. As such 
they were independent thinkers who sought to understand Buddhist ideas as 
they related to the matrix of their lived concern. 
rDzogs-chen thinking can be characterized by two trends, which, 
although present in other Buddhist traditions, were developed to their fullest 
degree in the rDzogs-chen tradition.9 First is the emphasis on what might be 
termed the evolutionary thrust and second, the focus on an ontological 
versus ontic understanding of being. The first focus is characteristic of the 
Buddhist tradition from its inception, though rDzogs-chen thinkers can be 
credited with bringing out the full implications of this idea.! 0 From the 
beginning Buddhism was concerned with transcending human limitations, 
such as emotional complexes and intellectual obscurations. and reaching the 
"other side". This !lother side" was variously described as nirvana, being free 
from limitations, offering unrestricted range of insight, etc. Early 
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formulations often conceived of the "goar as a special state or attainment, 
and often this amounted to a kind of "escape". 
With later developments in Buddhist thinking the path became seen 
as an unfoldment of potential rather than an escape. The new ideal became 
the Bodhisattva who transcended his merely selfish concerns to work for the 
benefit of all beings. The paradigm shifted to one of evolution in which the 
self- organizing dynamics of change were emphasized. In the rDzogs- chen 
tradition the focus on self-organization and the emphasis on a dynamic 
viewpoint was brought out in its fullest implications. While the Yogacara 
school of Buddhism had moved towards this dynamic conception, they failed 
to account for the possibility of structural change in which new dynamic 
regimes could evolve. rDzogs-chen thinkers developed ways of conceiving of 
the intricate and complicated operations of self-organizing systems in terms 
of a hierarchical order. Within this conception was imbedded the insight 
that higher orders of complexity involved integration and interpenetration. 
From their earliest contact with BUddhism. Tibetan thinkers were 
attracted to the idea of the evolutionary movement in which new regimes of 
wholeness and integrity are attained. This is evidenced in the translation of 
the Sanskrit term buddha. a descriptive term for a qualitative state of being 
characterized as being fully awake. Tibetans saw this term as expressing 
evolutionary dynamics and chose the term sangs-rgyas which describes a 
dynamic process in which all negative obscurations are gone (sangs) and all 
positive qualities have expanded (rgyas). Modern scholars have compared 
this characterization to that of a dissipative structure, a term coined by 
Nobel prize winning chemist Ilya Prigogine to describe how new dynamic 
regimes may originate from non-equilibrium conditions.lt These process 
structures emerge from conditions in which entropy is "dissipated" (sangs) 
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and a "new" order of higher complexity is instantiated (rgyas). In this 
dynamic notion the problem of change or growth is answered. This insight 
was an advance over the earlier Buddhist philosophical systems, generally 
arising within the Indian context. The Yogacara thinkers, who most strongly 
prepared the Hne of questioning out of which this insight emerged, 
themselves failed to account for the possibility of radical change and could 
only think in terms of the transformation of a basic entity not the radical 
metamorphosis in which new dynamic regimes are reached. 
The concern with evolutionary dynamics is further illustrated in the 
translation made of two very important terms in Buddhist thinking: bodhi 
and bodhicitta. which were translated as byang-chub and bYang-chub-kyi­
~ respectively 12. A common English translation of the Sanskrit term 
bodhi is "enlightenment" 13. This translation fails to indicate the dynamic 
process that Tibetans came to understand which was certainly more than 
just a blissful end-state. The Tibetan understanding of the terms bodhi and 
bodhicitta (often translated as "thought of enlightenment") has nothing of 
the static connotations implied by some interpreters still trapped in the 
theories of 18th and 19th century rationalism. Vimalamitra. who is 
considered to be one of the most important early rDzogs-chen thinkers, 
elaborates on byang-chub-sems as such: 
"byangtt , the clearing of emotions with their habitual
tendencies. 
"~tt, the consummateness of the meaning-rich gestalt's 
system dynamics. 
"KJDJ.", invariant and without defects 
Its greatness, the highest endogenous pristine 
cognitiveness,
Therefore this is called "byang-chub-sems".14 
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In the term byana-chub-sems we can detect the combination or two 
operations into one dynamic process. On the one hand byaua is 
characterized as the clearing away of emotional obscurations that result in 
habitual patterns. These emotional attachments and reactions serve to keep 
the system within certain parameters of operation described as habitual 
tendencies. Qnm., on the other hand, suggests a granting of meaning and the 
optimal operation of the system as a whole, as pristine cognitiveness. Unlik.e 
the habitual patterns of emotional reactivity, pristine cognition (here the 
term could refer to cognitionl or the process of cognition) is ever fresh in 
revealing new perspectives. In this sense the freshness and newness of 
cognition is not vitiated in any way. Combining these ideas produces a 
dynamic notion. again analogous to a dissipative structure, in which entropy 
is dissipated and a new hierarchical order emerges. This is a dynamic 
process in which two different notions, the purifying aspect and the 
consummate thereness aspect, are fused into one dynamic process. The term 
RDU. suggests an intention towards this process, which is unchanging and 
without any defects. 
It follows from this conception of byang-chub-sems. which we 
translate as "intention towards pure and consummate presence", that the 
concern of rDzogs-chen thinkers was not model-building. Instead rDzogs­
chen thinking was concerned with processes in which growth and evolution 
occur rather than with some model of "reality", "universe" or "being" that 
human subjectivity then fits within. This concern is aligned with the second 
characteristic that has been attributed to rDzogs-chen thinking, namely the 
ontological focus. This focus can be characterized as the movement away 
from attempting to account for reality in terms of "entities" or even 
"processes" that can be delimited towards the asking of the question of the 
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meaning of being. It is the very fact of the openness of being that allows 
entities to appear in their "thing-like" character. Thus Being (capitalized 
merely to distinguish this term from the ontic sense in which we speak of 
"beings") has a priority which in some sense encompasses and allows for 
encountering "things". In rDzogs-chen thinking the concern is with Being in 
its wholeness. thus this approach is termed "absolute completeness" (rDzogs­
~). This tradition. according to Guenther. "regards all partial perspectives 
as but local and temporal fluctuations within the atemporally abiding. non­
localizable mystery that is Being as such" 1S. 
In Western perspective it was Heidegger who in our century opened 
up the question of Being, which became the guiding thread throughout his 
thinking. Heidegger saw that in the metaphysical trend in philosophy the 
.. 
larger question of Being had become obscured. Indeed the tendency to 
restrict discussion to an ontic level in which everything is treated as some 
type of "thing" that can be identified and described leaves little room for the 
questioning of Being to occur. Metaphysics is characterized as an effort to 
give an account of what there is in the universe and what it is like. As 
Schrag has stated: "in a sense the history of metaphysics could be understood 
as the history of the categories of substance and causality".16 This 
metaphysical approach is similar to the approach found in schools of Indian 
Buddhist philosophy that focus on how we know. However both the 
metaphysical and epistemological trends remain oblivious to the important 
question of the wider implications of Being. For example this questioning 
might ask how it is that entities appear in their thing-like manner or what it 
means to be. The ontological concern is based on the concrete experience of 
being- in-the-world and involves a return to the dynamic field of experience 
from which the concern with individual entities arises. 
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Our investigation of the distinction between excitatory intelligence 
(rig-pa) and mentation (~) wiH centre on a commentary by Yon-tan rgya­
mtsho (Nineteenth century)l7 on 'jigs- med gling-pa's (1730-1798) 
influential work the YQn-tan rin-pQ- che'! mdzQd 18 (hereafter abbreviated 
as Yon-tan mdzod). This highly regarded text of the rNying-ma traditiQn 
presents a comprehensive overview explaining the main thrust of the 
Buddhist enterprise and is, in addition, also regarded as an important 
intrQduction to rDzogs-chen thinking. The YQn-tan mdzQd cQnsists Qf a 
primary text written in verse and a IQnger interlinear commentary 
explicating its meaning. Often the CQm mentary is needed tQ make full sense 
of the primary verses. The originaJ commentary by 'jigs-med gling-pa 
. incorporates the primary verses by dividing them into units of lines bearing 
on a common theme and then by singling Qut the compQnent wQrds and 
phrases for explication. Yon-tan rgya-mtsho's commentary is divided 
according to a structural analysis (sa-bead) of the original verses written by 
his teacher dPal-sprul 'jigs-med-chQs-kyi- dbang-pQ (bQrn 1808)19 and 
incorporates the root text intQ the commentary. We have focused primarily 
on the CQm mentary Qf YQn-tan rgya-mtshQ as it is Qften clearer and mQre 
helpful in clarifying key pQints. 
Both Yon-tan rgya-mtshQ and 'Jigs-med gling-pa appear at a relatively 
late periQd in the development Qf rDzogs-chen thinking20 . Indeed 'jigs-med 
gling-pa was concerned that these teachings might disappear and thrQugh 
his \\.~itings attempted tQ consQlidate and preserve the impQrtant ideas of 
this traultiv:!. The Yon-tan mdzod does not express original ideas as much as 
sum up and preserve the insights of a tradition already established and in 
danger of disappearing. 'jigs-med gling-pa was strongly influenced by the 
writings of perhaps the seminal figure Qf the rDzogs-chen tradition. Klong­
11
chen rab- 'byams-pa (1308-1364l. This influence is directly reflected in the 
YQn-tan mdzQd. a wQrk mQdelled after the Sems-nyid Ngal-gsQ Qf KIQng-chen 
rab-'byams-pa21 . The distinctiQn between Qrdinary mentation and 
excitatory intelligence is discussed in the twelfth chapter Qf the Yon-tan 
mdzod in which the rDzogs-chen approach is detailed. 
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B) The Hermeneutic Approach, 
Approaching the reputed insights of another tradition raises the 
problem of translation. How can a translator know if a translation captures 
the uniqueness of the work that is being translated rather than merely 
transforming it into something else through the categories and structures of 
his own conceptual network. This problem is not unique to the study of 
texts from other periods or cultures. Instead the problem of translation is 
intimately connected with the wider issue of understanding.22 Hermeneutics 
is concerned with coming to understand new meaning, and in particular, 
with the problem of bridging the gap between the familiar world and the 
"alien" meanings that await understanding. It is not limited to the 
philosophical arena but shows up in other approaches as well. In general we 
might say that the "hermeneutic" approachis founded on the recognition 
that we cannot divorce phenomena from our way of approaching and 
understanding the m. 
In Western philosophy, hermeneutic thinkers, like Heidegger and 
Gadamer, have suggested that in approaching the insights of a tradition, we 
find ourselves already embedded in the horizons of a familiar world. These 
horizons of the interpreter's world. while usually not themselves the object 
of investigation. indeed constitute an essential precondition for any 
understanding to occur. This "hermeneutic circle" illustrates the dilemma 
that all interpretation and understanding presuppose. what Heidegger called, 
the ''fore-structure fl23 of understanding. Instead of treating the fore­
structure as a problem that must be overcome in the act of understanding or 
as a limitation placed upon understanding, Heidegger viewed it as a positive 
fact that grounds the act of knowing. 
13 
In Being and Time. Heidegger established the priority of "dasein" as 
the unique entity that exists and also has an understanding of what it means 
to exist. Dasein is always found as being in the world, which is not a static 
container having determinable content, but a horizon of intentions that 
already determines how things will be present. "Having" a world is a 
characteristic of Dasein's being. Dasein is thus distinguished from the objects 
that appear in the world but cannot be said to "have" a world. The "fore­
structure" of understanding indicates the positive fact of Dasein's 
comprehension of being, not as a fixed or final product, but as part of the 
ongoing history of being-in-the-world24. Accordingly, the hermeneutic 
circle is not so much a closed circle as a spiral. Understanding is based in 
existence and operates as the interplay of the fore-structure of 
understanding and the subject matter itself25. 
Gadamer has suggested the metaphor of a conversation to describe the 
hermeneutical process and has described a conversation as the fusion of 
horizons26. On one side we have the horizon of the interpreter, not as a 
personalhorizon. but rather "more as a meaning and a possibility that one 
brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own 
what is said in the text"27. The other side is the horizon of the text, not as a 
container of some pre-established meaning, but as a challenging presence 
that elicits and draws the response and concern of the reader. 
This whole process also presupposes that in order for understanding 
to occur. reputed insights must be accessible through experience. From the 
beginning, Buddhist authors have stated that claims must be confirmed by 
experience. The Buddhist impetus towards realizing the fullness of being is 
only maintained when individuals experience and embody this fundamental 
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concernZ8. The emphasis on experience can be traced to the historical 
Sakyamuni Buddha who, as A. K. Warder wrote: 
...rejected all authority except experience: 
the student should experiment for himself 
and see that the teaching is true, not accept 
it because the Buddha says so.29 
The denial that authority can provide reliable knowledge precludes 
Buddhism from being included in the ordinary classification scheme of 
"religions". since Buddhism does not claim that religious knowledge emanates 
from a transcendental realm divorced from human experience. In general 
we might regard Buddhism as an empiricism if there were not the 
association of this term with the philosophy known as "Empiricism".30 
While understanding must appeal to experiencet the notion of 
"experience" is equally open to questioning and examination. F.S.C. Northrop 
suggested that there is a general tendency in the West to restrict experience, 
certainly when talking of philosophical or scientific matters, to the thematic, 
or to what Northrop calls the "differentiated aesthetic continuum"31. What 
is rational is what can be circumscribed, separated out and measured. With 
Eastern thinking, however. great value and acceptance is placed on the 
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". The nature of experience itself must 
be questioned. As Gadamer has stated, "understanding does not occur when 
we try to intercept what someone wants to say to us by claiming we already 
know it"32. 
Nineteenth century empiricism may have suggested that experience is 
a purely neutral term, but this term is as much rooted in pre-judgement as 
is any other concept. In this regard Buddhist thinking has been more closely 
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akin to the phenomenological attitude, which places the naturalistic­
objectivistic attitude in brackets. However there are two general 
interpretations of the phenomenological attitude that must be distinguished. 
The first sees phenomenology as the attempt to determine "experience" in 
terms of the constitutive aspect of the intentional arch, tending towards a 
type of "idealism" in which a transcendental subject emerges along with "the 
things themselves". Whether or not Husserl himself falls into this 
interpretation cannot be dealt with here; suffice it to say that this is a 
com mon interpretation. usually developed by those who reject the 
phenomenological approach. 
The second interpretation of "phenomenology" sees the 
phenomenological approach as a necessary corollary to the hermeneutic 
project. Phenomenology, as Heidegger suggested, is presupposed by the 
hermeneutic project. To aUow for the self- showing of beings to occur, such 
that beings emerge in their thing-like aspect, an opening must be possible. 
The bracketing of the naturalistic-objectivistic attitude can be delineated as 
a suspension of sedimented ways of taking up projects that allows an 
opening so that meaning can arise in a free and spontaneous manner. 
Phenomenology, at least as Heidegger sees it, is a choice in favour of 
meaning. If consciousness is consciousness of. and if it is meaning, not 
things, that consciousness is most im mediately concerned with, then 
phenomenology presupposes the hermeneutical choice of meaning. The 
choice of meaning, as Ricoeur termed it, does not imply idealism. He stated: 
That consciousness is outside of itself, that it 
is towards meaning before meaning is for it 
and, above all, before consciousness is {Qr. 
16 
i1se.lL is this not what the central discovery 
of phenomenology implies733 
The rDzogs-chen approach puts great value on the opening up of the 
field of experience and the encounter with fresh meanings. However this 
does not call into question the great instrumental value of conceptual or 
convention ways of knowing. Upholding the value of openness might seem 
to involve devaluation of conceptual knowledge. But this hasty conclusion 
fails to appreciate that the criticism of conceptual knowledge is only meant 
to allow for the openness in which new meanings can arise. This is stated 
negatively by insisting that openness cannot be hindered by the limitations 
of acquired conceptual infrastructure and the outlines of tacit understanding. 
Neither is openness served by treating what is said only in terms of one set 
of linguistic formulae to be mapped onto another. An honest attempt at 
understanding, according to Heidegger, is a confrontation with "otherness" 
and the leap into the belonging- togetherness of Man and Being: 
It is not until the entry into the sphere of 
the mutual assignation is effected that 
thought experience becomes attuned to it 
and determined.34 
In this regard, the rDzogs-chen tradition has anticipated Heidegger's famous 
"turn" that can be seen as a deepening of the original question of the 
meaning of Being, which in Being and Time takes Dasein as it focus of 
questioning, to an attempt to think Being in its wholeness. To anticipate the 
conclusion that will follow; mentation (S.1I1l) remains on the ontic level 
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involved with entities and relations, while excitatory intelligence (rjg- pal is 
the recovery of the openness and radiance of intel1igence in its unrestricted 
range of operation. 
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CHAPTER TWO
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
A) Introduction to the Problem of Mind 
In order to present the unique contributions of rDzogs-chen thinkers, 
it is necessary to show how the understanding of mind developed in the four 
schools of Buddhist philosophy. This critical account of Buddhist philosophy 
will be complimented by a discussion of the problem of mind as it is 
understood, explicitly or tacitly, by contemporary Western thinkers. The 
focus on contemporary thinking is motivated by hermeneutic concerns. The 
horizon of understanding upon which a genuine meeting with another 
tradition can take place cannot be treated as transparent. In the concrete act 
of translation, the translator should occupy a mediating position exposing the 
prejudgments of one side to the logic of the subject matter discussed on the 
other and vice versa. 
The term mind is used with reservation because of the manifold 
problems its usage presents. The resulting confusion has been delineated in 
detail by modern philosophers, yet a consensus on how to solve these 
difficulties is not forthcoming. Neither can psychology be of much help here. 
Psychologists readily admit that there is no widely accepted definition of 
mind.35 Simply disregarding or criticizing the usage of the term will not 
help to clarify the issues involved. Instead this thesis will draw upon and 
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clarify insights regarding mind and "experience" while recognizing the 
difficulties these terms often present. Addressing these difficulties 
necessitates entering the contemporary debate as the discussion warrants. 
In addition it may prove helpful to draw on directions in modern thinking 
that parallel or assist in bringing out the insights of rDzogs-chen thinkers, 
An additional cautionary note is necessary regarding the "fixity" of the 
translation of the Tibetan term B.Dlt. This term may take on different 
connotations depending upon the particular approach different schools or 
traditions take. To address this problem we have translated the term B.Dlt 
according to context. While this policy involves some added complications, it 
would be misleading to suggest that B.Dlt has had a constant understanding 
throughout the development of Buddhist thinking. To maintain that a term 
has had a fixed meaning within a "school" of Buddhist philosophy is a 
simplification. As Guenther has pointed out, Eastern thinking is bereft of a 
term that might correspond to the Western term "philosophy".36 The 
Tibetan term grub-mtba'. which has been translated as "school of 
philosophy", aetuaJ1y means to come to the end (mtha') of one's looking and 
set the results down (gr.ubJ. According to many of the most creative 
Buddhist thinkers, there is no limitation to going on and seeing something 
new. 
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B) Early Buddhist Theories of Mind 
The earliest attempts to synthesize and set out in coherent form the 
insights regarding mind (mtJ., ~) occurs in what is known as the 
Vaibhi~ika system. Vaibhi~ika thinkers analyzed reality by distinguishing 
the various kinds of elements thought to comprise it37. They were 
phenomenalists who held that experience and reality value are synonymous. 
The elements of which they spoke were not considered to have a reality 
independent of experience. But what of the reality of something not 
experienced, like a dog shut in the next room? If we do not experience a 
dog, its reality, like the very possibility of our experiencing it, is not given. 
The elements that the Vaibhi,ikas dealt with were not considered in terms 
of the Western notion of substance, a concept based on the distinction 
between "things" and their "properties". Instead the Vaibha,ikas attempted 
a neutral descriptive approach that described these elements of reality in 
terms of what is directly present, which in some cases is a quality, 
sometimes a feeling tone. The Vaibhisikas claimed that their analysis 
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included everything in the experiential field and, therefore, all aspects of 
reality. 
These existents are distinguished on the basis of whether they are 
considered to be transitory or permanent. Most of the existents are 
transitory events, arising through and dependent on causal patterning. The 
three absolutes38 are a special group of existents that would seem to 
contradict the general Buddhist insistence on transitoriness. The "absolutes" 
are necessary to account for a fundamental assumption of Buddhist thinking, 
namely that it is possible to escape the causal1y patterned confines of 
samsara. This possibility, like all other elements of reality, must "elist" and 
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since it is not dependent on a causal nexus, it must be an absolutely existing 
element. This possibility of freedom was thought to include the possible 
cessation of samsara due to insight as well as the possible cessation 
independent of such insight. It seems that with this second absolute 
Buddhist thinkers recognized that the possibility of transcending one's 
limited world had an independence from any particular "insight" and could 
exert an influence "independently". The third absolute is spaciousness, 
which has been described as the meaningful horizon of Being and is closely 
related to the encounter with the other two absolutely existing elements39. 
Within the Vaibha~ika analysis ~ (here "mind" is appropriate) is 
considered as a dominant or primary factor in consciousness. Although 
mind is considered as an existent, it is an aggregate of skandhas: a 
transitory conjunction of functions rather than some kind of substance 
assumed to have duration and independence. Functional relatedness gives 
the impression of continuity and leads to the tendency to posit a "self", 
without contradicting the experience of transitoriness. Mind (~) can 
further be analyzed in terms of various mental events. Five of these are 
considered to be ever-present; being in contact (reg- pal with a perceptual 
situation. relating the contents of this situation to a "centre" or "ego" (yid la 
byed-oa), the feeling- tone of a situation (tshor-ba), conceptualization which 
deals with specific aspects of the objective situation ('du-shes), and the 
overall directionality of mind, similar to the notion of intentionality (sems­
na)40. There are forty-six other mental events, ranging from attention to 
rage and decorum. These mental events mayor may not be present in 
cognitive situations.41 
In summary the Vaibhi~ika account analyzed reality in terms of 
individual existents or elements that somehow came in contact with one 
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another. Sems. which we translate here as "mind", stands for a central event 
that is accorded a primary position in terms of being the organizing nexus 
around which other cognitive events are grouped. Furthermore, this event is 
somehow able to come into contact with other "elements" of reality. 
Although mind is considered as the primary factor in consciousness, it is still 
analyzed in terms of building blocks. The Sautrantikas were to point out this 
shortcoming: how could knowledge result from the contact of individual 
elements. each of which has its own distinct character, and further. how 
could this divergent collection of events come together and form what we 
experience as a unified situation? 
Already in Vasubandhu's summary of this early scholastic tradition is 
a trend moving away from thinking in terms of entities and towards 
conceiving of the mental as a processing having various phases. In the 
Abbidbarmakosa, a work which can be interpreted as representing a 
Sautrantika viewpoint of the Vaibhi~ika system, mind and mental events 
are not taken as discrete existents: 
Mind (~ and mental events (sems­
byung) necessarily occur together.42 
This tendency to reject the entitative approach for a more process structure 
one is further born out in the re- interpretation of the Sanskrit terms rutA 
(~, manas (tid) and YiifiinA (rnam-par shes-pa), which the earlier 
Buddhists conceived of as different entities. In the Abhidharmako~athese 
"elements" are now said to distinguish different phases in the processing 
termed mindlmentation.43 Mind (mt&. Bml) is characterized as a 
"reaching out for" or "being ready for" process.44 Guenther has suggested 
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that mind can be seen as a feedback, feed-forward process that is both 
responsive and creative.45 Because of this "subjective" connotation, we 
might say that R.1D.1 can be described as an attitude. Ykl (manas), as the 
next important phase in the cognitive processing, is the synthesizing agency 
that might be termed the subjective disposition. It is also described as the 
"meeting place" Where the data brought by the senses and the interpreting 
and patterning of the subject are brought together.46 Rnam-par shes- pa 
(vijnina) is that agency whereby distinct cognitive judgments are made. 
Implied in this operation is a splitting up of the cognitive gestalt and a 
singling out of particular aspects, such that a distinct cognitive judgement 
can be made. 
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.. ­C) The Yagacara Innovation 
With Yogicira thinkers the emphasis on the process character of 
mind, noted by the Sautrantika school, was developed to its logical 
conclusion and a radically new conception of mind and world was created. 
This innovation was of key importance in leading into rDzogs-chen thinking. 
Mi-pham (1846-1914) summed up the thrust of the Yogicira position as: 
all elements of reality are subsumed under 
~ alone. That which has ultimate 
validity is the cognitive event devoid of both 
subjective grasping and objective 
determination.47 
We have left ~ untranslated in the preceding quotation. While "mind" 
has been an adequate translation of this term up until now, at this point in 
the development of Buddhist thinking the common translation breaks down. 
According to Yogicira thinkers the notion of ~ must be broadened 
to include both subject and object poles of experience. Phenomenological 
philosophers have shown that a careful description of experience reveals 
that every cognitive situation has both a noetic pole, that is a mode of 
experiencing, as well as a noematic pole, that is a "something" experienced.48 
Within the context of Yogicara philosophy it may be more appropriate to 
translate ~ as ffexperience", with the proviso that experience includes 
both noetic and noematic poles. Yogacira thinkers saw that ordinary 
experience is continually structured in terms of our projects at hand (gzung), 
which we take up or apprehend in a certain way depending upon subjective 
demands (:.dziDJ. There is not a duality of subject and object but rather two 
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intentional poles that belong together and actually even presuppose each 
other. Tibetan thinkers used the compound term "gzung-'dzin" to refer to 
the structure of ordinary experience: "gzung" meaning literally 
"apprehendable" or that which elicits interest and ., J1zin." the act of seizing 
or grasping.49 Taken together, the two terms describe the bipolar nature of 
experience, indicating a complimentarity in which there is an act of 
apprehending as well as that which elicits interest. 
The interdependence of the subjective and objective poles of 
experience has been brought out by the French phenomenologist Maurice 
Merteau-Ponty: 
The positing of the object therefore makes 
us go beyond the limits of our actual 
experience which is brought up against and 
halted by an alien being, with the result that 
finally experience believes that it extracts all 
its own teaching from the object. C,,) The 
whole life of consciousness is characterized 
by the tendency to posit objects, since it is 
consciousness, that is to say self-knowledge, 
only in so far as it takes hold of itself and 
draws itself together in an identifiable 
object. And yet the absolute positing of a 
single object is the death of consciousness, 
since it congeals the whole of existence, as a 
crystal placed in a solution suddenly 
crystallizes it.50 
While Merteau-Panty stressed that the whole life of consciousness can be 
characterized as the tendency to posit objects, he also stressed that the 
positing of a single object results in the congealing of the field of experience. 
While experience is intentional it is a fluid process of 
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apprehending/elicitation, which can become fixated on particular "objects", 
This fixation. as Mer1eau-Ponty stated, "kills" the very life of consciousness 
by the positing of a definite object. 
For Buddhist thinkers the grasping of "objects" introduces a kind of 
concretization into the fluidity of experience. Once the product of this 
operation is taken as a solid object it gathers around it all sorts of 
attachments and aversions. The repetition of such a concretization with the 
attendant emotional complexes results in habitual tendencies (bag-chags), 
which when suitably stimulated in the appropriate circumstances, reassert 
themselves as the habits and routines of ordinary experience. This diverts 
energy and attention away from what is spontaneously given (lhun- grub) 
and leads to a straying from the immediacy of the experiential field into the 
opaque, structure-bound nature of everyday concern. Yogicara thinkers 
considered much of experience, which includes the outline of our world as 
well as specific aspects, to be the result of such a process, summed up under 
the term kun-gzhi. the Tibetan rendering of the Sanskrit alaya-vijiiinaS 1. 
The Yogacira system is also called Cittamatra (sems-tsam), a term that 
draws attention to "~", the Sanskrit term for ~ as being that alone 
(lUJD.) which is most important. At this point we can translate Km.S. as 
"experience" and interpret sems- tsam as an insistence that it is experience 
alone that matters. Indeed although the Yogicira system is often termed 
"mentalism" or even "idealism", it would be more accurate to characterize 
this movement of thinking as a return to the openness of experience. 
Yogacira thinkers insisted that experience alone matters both in terms of 
correctly analyzing the human problem situation and also in forming the 
ground upon which any experimenting with overcoming these problems 
happens. 
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The focus on the primacy of experience is a suspension of the usual 
objectivistic tendency to divide up "the world" into elements that are 
assumed to be either mental or physical. We must be careful to 
acknowledge that the return to experience does not prejudge experience as a 
"mental" phenomenon as contrasted with "objects". An "idealistic" 
interpretation of experience in which there are only mental processes would 
only be a choice of one type of entity (namely mental process or "ideas") 
over another (possibly physical entities). This position would remain within 
the overall subject/object dichotomy that the Yogicira system opposed. 
Instead we might consider the Yogacira view as a kind of realism in the 
sense that Yogacira thinkers insisted on remaining within a rigourous 
analysis of experience itself and insisted that speaking of "objects" as though 
they were somehow already "objectively" given is already to prejudice the 
inquiry. 
On the face of it, the objectivity of the "external world" seems to be 
one of our strongest and most confidently held beliefs. The corollaries of the 
"objectivist" theory that most concerns us here is the separation of the 
mental and the physical realms. the problem of the mind and the body. Not 
only is this position explicitly maintained by many philosophers and 
scientists, it also falls within a background of tacit knowledge within the 
Western tradition. In coming to terms with the insights suggested by 
Yogicira and rDzogs-chen thinkers, this is probably one of the most difficult 
pre-judgments52 to surmount. This is the theory of the "two worlds" in 
which the Mental world is characterized as being internal, subjective and 
transparent to experience, while the Physical world is characterized as being 
external, objective and only problematically related to experience. 
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The severance of the mental and the physical realm has never been 
accepted by Buddhist thinkers. While it is certainly true that the early 
Vaibhi~ika school of philosophy analyzed existence in terms of different 
entities, there was not the same distinction between the mental and the 
physical. According to the Vaibhi~ikas the physical-material is said to 
comprise both the sense objects (colour, sound, fragrance, taste, touch) as 
well as the senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, bodily feelings); both sides of 
the alleged mental/physical split. 
The origins of the mind/body problem in the West are often traced 
back to seventeenth century philosophers like Locke, but especially 
Descartes. According to Wallace Matson, the Greek philosophers had no way 
to divide the events of the "inner" world, understood as states of 
consciousness, from events in the external world53. This was later supplied 
through the notion of "idea", which became the key term in the philosophy of 
John Locke who defined it as "... whatsoever is the object of the 
understanding when a man thinks".54 The next step is inevitable; how can 
there be valid knowledge of anything "outside" of "ideas" and their 
relationships7 
Descartes in the inquiries attempted to meet this skepticism head on. 
It is significant. however. that even the rules that guide his critical method 
contain a model of mind as the internal forum in which "objects" present 
themselves: 
The first (of four rules) was to accept 
nothing as true which I did not evidently 
know to be such, that is to say, scrupulously 
to avoid precipitance and prejudice, and in 
the judgments I passed to include nothing 
additional to what had presented itself to 
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my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I 
could have no occasion for doubting it 
(underlining is mine).SS 
We are left with the central problem of Cartesian epistemology: how 
can certain knowledge be guaranteed if the mind and what it knows are 
fundamentaJIy different types of entities. separated by the gulf between the 
"inner" and the "outer" worlds. The internality of the mind leads naturally to 
lhe conclusion that. knowing the external world, since this is of a different 
stuff than the mental, involves representation,56 Richard Rorty has 
suggested that mind is then conceived of as the mirror of nature, which 
suggests "the notion of knowledge as accurate representation made possible 
by special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of 
representation",57 Current theories of cognition termed "information 
processing" fall into this paradigm. However other approaches to cognition 
call this paradigm into question. Some of these have been termed 
"hermeneutical", "self-organizing" or "auto-poietic"58. 
One prevalent response to the epistemological problem has been to 
absolutize the subjective viewpoint, as in the Kantian transcendental subject. 
From the Buddhist tradition, the notion of an absolute subject (itman) as a 
permanent entity was always rejected. The Buddhists would certainly agree 
with Kant as far as his contention that cognition involves categories of 
judgement that are "brought to" rather than "abstracted from" the perceptual 
situation. However Buddhist thinkers asserted that the subject is 00­
constituted along with other "categories". Here the distinction from the Hindu 
schools can be drawn.59 The rejection of the absolute ego, or self. by 
Buddhist thinkers was consistent with the observation of the impermanence 
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of a11 things as well as from a developing functional model of mind and 
menta! processes. 
The problems that arise out of a belief in an objeetively- given world 
have surfaced in other areas of research. The biologists Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela have had to reject the notion of the "objective world" in 
order to develop their innovative theory of the biological roots of 
knowledge60. Maturana and Varela suggest that an organism must be 
treated as an auto-poetic (literally "self-producing") unity whose nervous 
system is characterized by operational closure. Instead of forming 
"representations" of the "objective world", the organism responds to a 
triggering from the environment. How the organism, as a unity having 
operational closure, responds is not determined. It is the nervous system's 
structural state that determines what perturbations are possible and what 
can trigger perturbations. In some sense it is the observer who determines 
its interaction with the environment by specifying to what perturbation it 
wiU respond. One could extrapolate from this conclusion and suggest that it 
is meaning that is of foremost importance even in the simplest acts of 
knowing. 
This view rejects the thesis that there is an "objective world" merely 
awaiting our discovery. Yet this does not imply solipsism since there is the 
constant interaction with the environment. The auto-poetic view merely 
rejects the thesis that the environment is prepackaged into "objective" form 
and insists that knowledge without the knower is an impossibility. In 
addition it insists that the intentions of the organism are inextricably linked 
to the types of relationships that may evolve and that these relationships 
include the maps that are formed. If cognition is intentional it makes no 
sense to deal with the objective pole without consideration of the subjective 
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role. Conversely it is also incomplete to speak of the sUbjective pole. as 
idealism has done, without reference to the objective pole. Instead the 
autopoetic view. like that of the Yogacaras, insists on the intentionality of 
cognition. 
The belief in the objectivity of the external world may arise from a 
confusion of levels of explanation. One level is that of direct experience. 
From this viewpoint al1 knowing is successful action. A second level of 
explanation arises in conceptualizing the environment in terms of the 
successful actions of various agents. This level of explanation also recognizes 
the coordination of action amongst agents through the use of language. Here 
it is convenient to assume that all knowers, as members of a linguistic 
community, inhabit the "same world". Instead of merely stating that 
members of a linguistic community share procedures and rules allowing for 
successful action, often this is taken as a claim for an objectively given state 
of affairs. The next step is to assume a common "objective" world that is 
seen by all others. The defects of this thesis are not readily apparent when 
business is as usual but appear in times of epistemological crisis. These 
epistemological crises often occur when encountering diversity amongst 
individuals, in artistic challenges to the accepted ways or when different 
linguistic communities are encountered. 
According to Heidegger's analysis Western philosophy is faced with 
such a crisis in the challenge of nihilism. Nihilism casts into doubt all 
foundations for human knowledge and valuation outside of relations of 
power. This crisis, thinks Heidegger. can only be met by opening up the 
question of being. In Heidegger's terms, Dasein is not merely an entity that 
"is" but an entity that in its very existence is born with an understanding of 
what it means to exist. It is this embodied understanding that grounds the 
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act of knowing and understanding. By insisting on the necessity or objective 
knowledge, without a knower, the objectivist discards the foundation of 
knowing and valuation. 
It is natural to think of the mental events as being somehow different 
in a fundamental way from events thought to be "in the world". However if 
we take experience as our basis, this intuition can be elaborated as 
distinguishing two modalities of experience, the one involving a cognition of 
an epistemological object. generally believed to refer to an ontological object, 
while the other focuses on the act of experiencing itself, a focusing on the 
content of awareness. This insight was suggested by Sautrantika thinkers, 
who were moving strongly in the direction of the position ultimately taken 
by the Yogicara school. This led to an examination of the place of non­
referential awareness (rang-rig) within experience. Non- referential 
awareness remains intentional but has not yet fallen into the trap of divisive 
thinking in which objects are taken to be something solid that can then be 
desired, rejected, or avoided. Intentionality is not rejected but rather is 
taken as a process having a fluidity of function, not as the static bridge 
between a pregiven object and an apprehending subject. In 
phenomenological terms. the positing of an ontological object to correspond 
to the epistemological object is bracketed. As Merleau-Ponty would say. the 
death of the consciousness has not yet occurred. In Yogicira thinking it was 
argued that nonreferential awareness remains within the domain of 
originary experience. From this viewpoint the conclusion that only non­
referential awareness is ultimately valid was established. 
The notion of non-referential awareness can be taken as implying a 
kind of solipsism. This criticism is certainly valid if one concludes that since 
all perception involves a mental process everything that is perceived must 
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be "mental". While it is likely that some of the Yogacara thinkers did 
subscribe to this view61, this conclusion does not bear on the main insight of 
Yogicara thinkers. Their main insight was to point out that "objects" do not 
have independent existence and that to believe in their independent 
existence is to stray from the immediacy of the given experiential field and 
to become lost in projections that dissolve upon examination. Instead of 
implying that the subject does not go beyond his own point of view, the 
Yogiclra school wished to point to the immediacy of experience before the 
schism of subject and object became firmly instantiated. Their claim was 
that non-referential awareness, because it is not caught up in what is 
believed to be objective referents, actually restores freshness and clarity to 
experience. 
D) The MidhYamlka CritiQue, 
The basic insight that phenomena cannot be divorced from our 
experience of them and that experience as such is therefore of greatest 
importance in man's meaning seeking activity was often lost sight of in 
subsequent critiques of the Yogacira position, The Madhyamikas argued that 
each philosophical system offered a model of what reality is like, Even the 
Yogicira system presented a model in which reality is seen as the 
functioning of .. mind", This model could not be said to be true because there 
is no relation between the model and the "reality" outside of it.62 It is 
important to summarize this critique as an means of setting the stage for the 
rDzogs-chen response and in particular for their new formulation of the 
important term sto02-pa.63 
The Midhyamikas critique may be seen as a relentless questioning of 
any claim that there are self-existing entities or relations. The Sanskrit term 
for such a claim is svabh'iya. translated into Tibetan as rang-bzhin. Rang­
bzhjn has been translated into English as "self-existence" or "own-being" and 
involves the claim that there is some self-sufficient principle that makes 
something what it is independent of external conditions. The critique of this 
notion is summed up under the terms sunyat'i in Sanskrit and by stong-pa 
mid. in Tibetan which has been variously translated as "emptiness", 
"openness" or "nothingness". From the Midhyamika position an 
uncompromising logical analysis reveals the inconsistency of any thesis that 
claims that "objects", whether these be material or mental, or relationships 
among "objects", exist. Indeed this criticism extends to include the notion of 
causality as understood in terms of a "final cause". Instead the 
Midhyamikas accounted for phenomenal appearance in terms of the notion 
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of dependent co- origination (oratltyasamutp'ida).64 All so-called entities 
arise in dependent relations and therefore have no self-existence, nothing 
that could define them as independent. Dependent co- ordination is not a 
cause and effect relationship for which some assumption of a least causally 
efficacious entities would seem to be required. Midhyamika thinkers also 
denied that there is an principle by which things arise. What appears as 
"entities" on the phenomenal level has no enduring substance since 
everything arises in dependent co-origination and this is, from the level of 
someone who properly apprehends reality, emptiness. 
The Midhyamikas critique of the Yogicira position reveals that in 
spite of the claim to stick to the immediacy of experience, a model of 
"reality" has crept in. This tendency to posit models is perhaps a necessary 
function of any attempt at an epistemology. In this regard it is notable that 
remaining within this hard-line critical position, as the Prasangika branch of 
the Midhyamika system did, provides little new in the way of analysis of 
the hu man condition. Every model has the limitation of being a particular 
viewpoint which. in making a claim. excludes other possibilities from being 
recognized. From a critical point of view, no model can withstand criticism. 
From an experiential viewpoint, it is difficult to live within models without 
feeling their constraining hold. It is in this regard that the more 
ontologically oriented Vajrayana schools of Buddhism kept alive the central 
concern with meaning, emphasizing the openness of experience and the 
creative participation of the individual. 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RDZQGS-CHBN APPROACH TO MIN-.D
A) How rDzogs-chen Surpasses the Philosophical Approaches 
The various approaches to mind of the Buddhist philosophical systems 
can be characterized as models that suggest appropriate ways to understand 
or approach what we can only lamely term "reality". The Mldhyamika 
school saw that each of these "models" were constructions and that the only 
truth value a construction has is of a relative nature. That is, the truth value 
of a construction is in its success with regard to fulfilling the intentions of 
the group formulating the theory. That "reality" or "being" or "universe" 
eludes capture in any model is certain, and evidenced in every occasion that 
goes beyond the confines of what we ltthink" or "describe" reality to be like. 
Although the Madhyamikas school criticized the "model-building" approach, 
it failed to show a way to get beyond the problems this approach engenders. 
The approach to mind attributed to the philosophical schools falls 
roughly into what is characterized as the "causality- directed vehicle" 
(rgyu'i-theg-pa). Causality, as interpreted by later Buddhist thinkers, does 
not imply "final cause" but instead is described in terms of the momentum of 
a process which tends towards particular phases or situations that can be 
singled out for analysis.65 In his commentary to the Yon-tan mdzod, Yon­
tan rgya-mtsho stated that the causality-directed approach is concerned 
with goal attainment ( ). The process of attaining the 
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The rDzogs-chen approach is considered by the rNylng-ma or "old" 
schools of Tibetan Buddhism to be the highest approach of the Vajrayana 
teachings. The tenth chapter of the Yon-tan Mdzod presents an introduction 
to the Vajrayana approach in general. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
go into this subject in detail or present an account of the specific 
subdivisions.67 We will focus on the teaching of the rDzogs-chen tradition 
without bringing out points of similarity or contrast with other Vajrayana 
approaches. 
In three verses of the Yon-tan Mdzod. 'jigs-med-gling-pa summed up 
how the rDzogs-chen approach differs from and surpasses the attempts of 
the philosophical schools to fathom and embody the Buddhist concern with 
the full realization of Being. 
Reasoning that develops arguments for disputation, 
analyzing, tracing steps, and following up, 
Diverges from what ultimately matters. 
Each experiences this directly, it is not an object that can be 
talked about. 
The reasoning of the philosophical systems which claim there 
are particular existents, 
is the reasoning of a limited and inferior level. 
The atemporal cognitiveness of the Victorious One goes beyond 
what can be cut up and analyzed 
The way of utter completeness (rDzogs-chen), from the 
beginning, free.68 
The reality of openness is not constrained by the presencing of 
the knowable. 
The energy of openness, in itself a lucency, 
is present as excitatory intelligence in the domain where 
pristine cognition and meaningful gestalt 
are inseparable like the sun and its energy. 
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The term don-dam which we have translated as "what ultimately 
matters", is composed of two terms, "~.' which among other meanings has 
the connotation of "meaning or value" and "!1i.m." which connotes "thatwhich 
holds or supports us" or "that which we hold to", "What ultimately matters" 
(don-dam) is contrasted with the level of conventional "kun-rdzob ,. in 
characterizing the two "realities", In contrast don-dam describes that which 
is experienced directly or as the quotation states. that which people can only 
experience for themselves, Yet this viewpoint is not a return to subjectivity 
but rather an insistence on the immediacy of experience and a refusal to be 
sidetracked into mere descriptions or models of "reality". This focus is 
actually an attempt to surpass individual limitations rather than give in to 
them as can be seen in a passage from the Bodhicaryayatara, quoted by Yon­
tan rgya-mtsho:69 
What ultimately matters is not an object for 
one's subjective activity, this subjective 
activity is what is caUed the conventional 
level. 
According to this viewpoint the conventionally accepted level of 
instrumental concern remains within the grasp of subjective thinking. We 
are interested in things because of how they concern or affect us, As Yon­
tan rgya-mtsho elaborated, each of the followers of a philosophical system is 
trapped by his own fetters like a silk worm caught in his own cocoon70. 
Each system tries to treat reality as some analyzable entity. whether this be 
a material thing or a mental substance, 
According to rDzogs-chen, the naive attitude with its belief in the 
existence of "things" occurs as a drop in the high level of cognitive excitation 
(rig-pa) in which the fluidity of intentionality hardens into the static 
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subject/object dichotomy. Instead of the free play of the noematic 
perspective in relationship with the noetic functioning, the noe matic pole is 
taken to be a fixed and final "thing". The concern with "things" is what is 
implied by stating that mentation is thoroughly bound up with the objective 
domain. rDzogs-chen thinkers did not deny the "reality" of the world of the 
naive attitude, a charge that has been laid against Eastern thinking as a 
whole on the basis of statements by later followers of post Shankara 
Vedanta. Instead they carefully distinguished between conventional truth 
(tun rdzob) and that which ultimately matters (don dam). For practical 
purposes there is no denying that language serves to identify and coordinate 
a multitude of human projects. But this instrumental usefulness may 
obscure the openness of cognition if "objects" are assumed to have 
independent existence. It is this assumption that rDzogs-chen thinkers 
strongly attacked. They saw it as a deviation from the primacy of 
experience in which a person engages in mistaken identification ('khrul-pa). 
The "object" then elicits emotional responses that lead into further and 
further blundering as one is faced with the problems arising out of taking 
something for what it is not. This involvement diverts attention and energy 
away from the problems that address an individu~l most directly, namely, 
finding meaning in life. It is the focus on the meaning of being, rather than a 
particular model of "Being" or "universe", that characterizes the Vajrayana 
approach. 
How does the central question of the meaning of beings get asked. 
rDzogs-chen thinkers saw clearly that Being (in the ontological sense) can be 
nowhere else than with beings. That is, human existence as unification of 
embodiment, speech, and sociality, is always suffused by Being. As Paul 
H~ber1in has seen, Being is always the being of that which is.71 Therefore 
41
there is not Being apart from or behind beings. nor is there Being as a whole, 
since being is not something. An ontological concern is concerned with the 
being of beings, and, in particular, what it means to be. 
Heidegger has dealt with the difference between a concern with Being 
and with the things we encounter in terms of "ontological difference".72 In 
general we can say that ontological difference points out the inherent 
difference between the things that are (beings) and Being as the lighting up 
process by which beings are illuminated as beings. Being (capitalized to 
indicate that we are speaking of being in the ontological versus the ontic 
sense) is necessarily a vague and general concept since it cannot be pointed 
out as something-that-is. It makes no sense to say: here is Being, or there it 
is not. Yet the vagueness of this formulation is not an expression of fuzzy or 
vague thinking but rather of the fact that the most general of concepts is 
necessarily the most broad and indeterminate. To even speak of "Being" is 
problematic, since it is to put "Being" into the same linguistic framework as 
other "thingsl/ that we may delineate and point out. The grammatical 
structure of our language leads us into the mistaken assumption that if Being 
is a noun. it must stand for a thing that can have certain properties and 
engage in or be the object of actions. To treat "Being" within this framework 
as a "thing", only perhaps more grand in sCope, overlooks the ontological 
difference. In relation to rDzogs-chen thinking we might provisionally say 
that the difference between mentation and excitatory intelligence is similar 
to the ontological difference in that mentation operates on the level of the 
ontic, that is, it deals with the things-that-are. while excitatory intelligence is 
commensurate with Being. 
In the ontological approach the climax or goal ('bras-bu) is said to be 
im mediately present in the same sense that we have indicated that Being is 
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nowhere else than in being. To bring thIs out. Guenther used the term 
"Being-Q.U,l-Bxistenz".73 He elaborated this situation by saying: 
Although, in fact. retaining an indivisible 
unitary character, Being-w.Ll-Existenz, in its 
unfoldment can be discussed in terms of a 
basic level or ground (gW), the progressive 
unfoldment of the process (lim), and the 
climaxing or optimization of the process 
('bras- bu). It must be remembered, 
however, that what may constitute an 
optimization from one perspective, may also, 
from another perspective, serve as the 
ground for further unfoldment.74 
This triad of ground, path, and goal show up in the structuring of the last 
three chapters of the Yon-tan mdzod. which present the rDzogs-chen 
approach. Bach of the three chapters presents one aspect of this triad. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to indicate the complicated 
interconnectedness and hierarchical dynamic of this presentation. However 
it is important to indicate the overall thrust of the rDzogs-chen 
interpretation. AJthough it is impossible to reduce intelligence to a 
theory, no matter how compelling, it is stIll possible to describe the 
operations. As we shall see, intelligence was described by rDzogs-chen 
thinkers as an integral aspect of Being. To delimit and circumscribe 
something termed "intelligence" or mind would be to remain in an ontic level 
of analysis and miss the unique contribution of rDzogs-chen thinking. 
Indeed, it is remaining within the ontic level that characterizes the low level 
operations of mentation (KID.l) and distinguishes this level from that of 
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excitatory intelligence (rig-ga) in which the dynamics of Being recover their 
free reach and range. 
In bringing out the distinction between mentation and excitatory 
intelligence we are forced, because of the holistic approach involved, to touch 
upon some on the main themes present in rDzogs-chen thinking. We shall 
anchor our discussion of this distinction in terms of the discussion 
undertaken in the Yon-tan mdzod and in particular, its elaboration in the 
commentaries by 'jigs-med gling-pa, Yon-tan rgya-mtsho, and dPal-sprul. 
As noted, these works were written at a late date in the development of 
rDzogs-chen thinking and largely summarize or preserve key insights of 
earlier thinkers. 
6) The rDmas-chen Account or Heina 
Integral to the rDzogs-chen approach is a concern for the totality of all 
that is, with nothing left out. This includes not just what can be pointed to 
and conceptualized, but also the llbackground" against which this singling out 
of things and meanings takes place. The totality may be referred to as the 
Universe proper, which is distinguished from any of the various "universes" 
or maps that we might make.7S Or we might speak of this as a concern for 
Being that is nowhere else than in "beings". The use of capital letters should 
not be taken as indicating that these are "absolutes", implying some ultimate 
or transcendent reality apart from or independent of experience, but rather 
to indicate that no matter how we talk of or model this totality, we never 
encompass that of which we speak. Yet it is clear that if we are to go beyond 
our limited models and habituated tendencies "Being" or "Universe" must be 
available in some way or other. 
rDzogs-chen thinkers refer to Being or Universe as the fftotality 
ground" (kun-gyi gzhi, not the same as kun-gzhi which has been discussed in 
Chapter Two)76 or simply "ground" (gztW, The totality ground or ground is 
described as lucent openness or open lucency (stoni-isal), the paradox of 
there being nothing and yet a lucency77. The eleventh chapter of the Y.ml:. 
tan mdzod discusses the ground as described by rDzogs-chen thinkers. In 
attempting to characterize the rDzogs-chen understanding of Being, in which 
Being as the whole defies categorization yet presents simultaneous facets of 
its underlying dynamics, Guenther has referred to "atemporally abiding 
aspeets",78 Unlike the entities that we assume to have a beginning point 
and an end, Being does not take place "in" time and cannot be said to have a 
temporal beginning or end. Instead Being presents the possibility for events 
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to occur in time and space. The aspects we single out from the dynamic 
wholeness are thus said to be "atemporal". The dynamic character of Being 
is described in rDzogs-chen thinking as simultaneously displaying three 
atemporally abiding aspeets:79 
1. dynamic openness (stong-pa), Being cannot be reduced to 
some-"thing". 
2. sheer lucency (gsaJ-ba), Being1s pure energy. 
3. excitatory inteUigence (rig-pa), the intrinsic inteUigence of 
Being. 
In rDzogs-chen thinking stong-pa nyid certainly connotes the absence 
of any ontological principle (bdag-med)' Stong-pa nyid for rDzogs-chen 
thinkers is not just a noun, implying a state of affairs that is a denial of the 
existence of "something", but taken in its verbal form emphasizes the 
dynamic aspect of "emptiness". Stong-pa which Tibetans understood as a 
verb as well as a noun, can also be used as an adverb in the form stongs. as 
in, for example. "becoming dissolved (stongs) of karma and emotional 
obscurations."80 Stong-pat usually translated as empty, or nothing, in the 
rDzogs-chen sense would refer to a much more active operation than is 
usually assumed from the Midhyamika interpretation. Therefore we could 
translate this term in the appropriate location as "opening up". as an active 
rather than a static notion implying merely the absence of something. 
rDzogs- chen texts often combine stong-pa with snang-ba as in the 
compound snang-stong. Snang. which is certainly a verbal form, means "a 
lighting up" or presencing but not a presencing of some- "thing", perhaps 
s1mHar to the Greek verbal rorm ghalnete1. with 1ts connotaUons or "l1ghung 
up. self-showing, coming out, appearing forth".81 In short this compound 
presents the combination of two seemingly contradictory ideas into a 
dynamic unity: of there being openness, not limited by "thingness" and yet a 
lighting up, a presence that is not a presence of some- lJlini. Heidegger in 
his latter thinking dropped the term "phenomenon" in favour of the verbal 
form "phainetei" to stress the self-showing nature. Vail hyphenates the term 
"letting-be- seen-that-which-shows-itself" to suggest the unity of this 
process.82 
The combination of two ideas that would at first seem to be mutually 
inconsistent, presencing and openness, into dynamic concept is characteristic 
of rDzogs-chen thinking, which attempts to describe Being in its wholeness 
rather than to dissect and build models of assumed regularities. The rDzogs­
chen interpretation of stong-pa as "openness" thus includes and surpasses 
the general Mldhyamika formulation of this principle as "emptiness". 
Instead of a presentation of nothingness with its associations of a void or the 
blackness of empty space, the actuality of openness is a radiant intensity. 
Guenther's investigations of the use of the term stong-pa in the Tibetan 
context have suggested that this idea might be comparable with recent 
results in Quantum theory in which, as P.C.W, Davies suggests: "we can no 
longer think of a vacuum as 'empty', Instead it is filled to capacity with 
thousands of different types of particles, forming, interacting and 
disappearing, in an incessant sea of activity,"83 
While we have already described how rDzogs-chen thinking goes 
beyond the Yogicira systemt here we can suggest how it transcends the 
Midhyamika formulations which have certainly had greater elposure in the 
West. Nagarjuna's Midhyamika system furnishes a critical method to 
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destroy any claim that entities may be "self-existent", Entities only arise and 
cease in a web of functional connections, If there are no entities, then words 
have no reference point and lose their meaning, Frederick J. Streng 
concluded that Nagarjuna's dialectics: 
denies the context in which the question of 
truth can be meaningfully answered through 
a particular expression or a universal 
intuition. The most forceful expression of 
such an empty relationship is silence ... 
which is indifferent to formulation or 
rejection of formulation. Where such silence 
is not understood, there a negative dialectic 
(which caUs into question even its own 
dialectical process) may be effective.84 
The lvfidhyamika position operates against a general view of language in 
which words stand for "thingsll be these objects, relations, or meanings. • 
Showing that these "things" cannot be said to have self-existence entails that 
speaking of "things" is no different from talking about phantoms or dreams, 
However this conclusion only follows from an "objectivist" theory of language 
that rDzogs-chen thinking would challenge. In rDzogs-chen thinking the 
discovery that "things" have no own-being occasions a return to the 
experiential matrix from which limited. purely relational concepts arise, and 
rediscovery of the creative potential of metaphor to bring an opening of 
perspective without taking anyone "metaphor" as being an endpoint.8; In 
the Western context this is what Nietzsche intimated by pointing out the 
metaphorical nature of language and the poetic nature of true philosophy,86 
The "objectivist" model of meaning, which is coming under renewed 
scrutiny by modern thinkers. fails to do justice to the what Mark Johnson 
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delineated as "embodied understanding".87 Johnson argued that traditional 
accounts of meaning, which he characterized as "objectivisf', fail to grant "a 
central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by 
which we grasp our world"88. This criticism of the objectivist model of 
language and the recovery of the body of lived understanding also has been 
argued by David Levin, who entitled his book The Body's Recollection of 
Being: Phenomenological psychology and the Deconstruction of Nihilism89. 
An objectivist account of meaning must look outside the so-called 
"subjective" experience of the embodied individual for a guarantee of 
meaningfulness and communicability. Such a standpoint ignores the richness 
of associative meaning and the creativity of suggestive metaphor90. An 
"objectivist" standpoint takes these facets out of the realm of serious 
discourse. Language is dis-connected and left without its connection to the 
expression and embodiment of lived experience. Neither is a subjectivist 
account of meaning an adequate alternative. It takes the other side of the 
subjective/objective dichotomy instead of developing a position in which the 
complementarity of the noematic and noetic poles of experience is 
recognized. In rDzogs-chen perspective, the complementarity of 
openness/radiance (stong-gsal) as a presencing but not the presencing of 
some-thing indicates that language can have no reference in the sense of an 
objective terminus. Instead language isa way of bringing a world into 
existence or is a way of pointing to the dynamics of experience, and yet has a 
transparency that does not allow it to be held onto as something that may be 
determined as final. 
In discussing the rDzogs-chen approach to Being, it is important to 
draw attention to a triad of terms used in rDzogs- chen ontological process 
thinking: ngo-bo 'facticity', rang-bzhin 'actuality' and thugs-rje 'resonating 
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concern·.91 Translating nao-bo as Iacticlty', a term that is important in 
Heidegger's thinking, points towards what we have termed the ontological 
sense. Heidegger explicated this term in Being and Time: 
Pacticity is not the factuality of the 
factum brutum of somethina present­
at-band. but a characteristic of 
Dasein·s Beina - one which has been 
taken up into eJ:istence. even if 
proJ:imally it has been thrust aside. 
The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes 
something that we can come across by 
beholding it.92 
That facticity has nothing to do with "some-thing", be this a substance or 
quality that we come across, is expressed in rDzogs- chen terminology as 
stong-pa, which we have described as a dynamic openness indicating the 
non-reducibility of Being. 
It is important to note that this account is not an attempt to explain 
but rather to describe the dynamics of the "ground". Instead of modelling 
"Being", rDzogs-chen thinking moves in the direction of what might be called 
"inner-standing", which is not a conceptual grasp of something one is able to 
view from without, but which is rather an inner understanding. "Inner" is 
used to stress the fact that Being is nowhere else than in beings, as 
previously noted. By attempting to understand the universe we also come 
to an understanding of ourselves as part of the universe. Self-understanding 
and the understanding of the broader universe may not be as diametricaUy 
opposed as is often supposed. 
Talking of "self-understanding" raises an immediate problem. How is it 
possible to indicate that understanding is reflexive without relying on the 
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existence of a "self" and restating the dissociation of the subject from the 
object. One way of resolving this problem is to draw upon the concept of 
"system". Anything can be conceptualized as a system. Self-reference can 
then be delineated as the reference of a system with regards to its own 
operation at particular times. 
Erich jantsch addressed this problem of self-reference with regard to 
self-organizing systems. jantsch's work supplements the insights of 
Maturana and Varela in developing a theory in which living, evolutionary 
systems are seen as autopoietic (literally self-producing) unities. As Jantsch 
stated: 
In a specific autopoietic regime, the system 
is self-referential with respect to a specific 
space-time structure. In a broader 
perspective, we may now characterize an 
evolving system as being self-referential 
with respect to its own evolution - that is to 
say, with respect to itself as a dynamic 
system with the potential of manifesting 
itself in a variety of structures, not in 
random order, but in coherent, evolutionary 
sequences. The levels of global stability an 
autopoietic existence revealed along such an 
evolutionary path are not predetermined, 
but result partly from the interaction 
between system and environment. In this 
respect, they represent true experience. We 
may also say that knowledge is expressed 
by the system's finding of its own stability 
with respect to fluctuations and, further, 
that this knowledge is nothing else but the 
experience of the interaction between 
system and environment, cast into a specific 
reference frame. In this sense, all 
knowledge is experience; objective and 
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subjective knowledge become
complementary.93
In this light the second abiding feature of the rDzogs-chen account of 
Being can be introduced. Rang-bzhin in the rDzogs- chen sense must also be 
distinguished from the usage of this term that has been criticized by 
Midhyamika thinkers. The usage of the term they criticized was the concept 
of self-nature. that is. the assertion that there is some principle of identity 
by which entities can be established to have independent existence. rDzogs­
chen thinkers concurred with the criticism of this usage of the term. Rang­
bZhin. in rDzogs-chen usage, is an ontological term. The term is composed of 
two units. The first, rAng, indicates "self" or "SUbject", but not in the sense of 
an ego or any other ontic "entity" that has been shown to have no 
independent existence. Rin& here points to Being since it is only Being that 
does not depend on something else. Thus r.lni...does not indicate a "self" as 
much as point to the holistic sense of Being. In this interpretation, "bzhin" is 
a continuative particle, which means that this subject as subject remains 
what it is. Thus rang-bzhin has been translated as "actuality"94. Every 
individual thing, event or meaning is without actuality and is only a 
construct. Only Being has actuality. 
Existence can be viewed from two perspectives. First existence has a 
particular pattern, a history and a particular setting. In a second sense 
Being, which allows the opening for this particular form of existence, is 
nowhere else than in existence. Existence presents the possibility of self­
understanding which includes not only the possibility of mirroring itself in 
its particUlarity but also the expression of Being itself. 
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Excitatory intelligence as an atemporally abiding aspect of Being is 
described as the intrinsic intelligence of Being. According to the Buddhist 
conception, intelligence is not an afterthought, or a type of design 
necessitating a creator. but rather an inherent feature of Being or Universe. 
According to the rDzogs-chen understanding of the dynamics of Being, sheer 
presence. which is not qualified as a presence of something but rather 
described as complementarity of openness and radiance, elicits a response 
simply by this presence. As noted, Existence is suffused by Being as 
indicated by the term Being-qua-Existenz. Existence thus presents the 
possibility for the disclosure of Being. In the resonating concern (thugs-rje) 
. is present the possibility of discovering the fullest reach and range of being 
or the possibility of becoming estranged from Being and losing freedom in 
the maze of fictions this estrangement engenders. 
The ground (gmt.) provides the possibility for going astray into the 
subjectivity of vested projects and affect-arousing fictions or. on the other 
hand, for going free. We have already indicated that according to Yogicara 
thinkers there are two structural deployments that experience may take: 
either into the increasing divisiveness and fixation of habitual blundering or 
into the free reach and range of pristine cognition. Throughout Yoglcara 
thinking the strongest emphasis was on the questions of knowledge and 
perception. Even the term Cittamatra or Sems-tsam indicates the cognitive 
dimension of experience. In rDzogs-chen thinking this narrower emphasis 
was broadened into a concern for the widest and most inclusive sense of 
Being. In some ways this is also the emptiest sense. since it includes all 
aspects, as well as the background out of which they have arisen. 
In rDzogs-chen thinking, Being provides the possibility for both going 
astray or remaining in (or recovering) the free range of Being's meaning rich 
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gestalt (chos-sku). This latter sense is described as the "a-dag the 
diaphanously pure. This purity is not a purity from sin, but rather is 
contrasted with the grime associated with the kun-gzhi the all-ground. 
which is associated with a drop in the excitation of excitatory intelligence. 
Thus the branching point is related to whether excitatory intelligence 
operates at its fullest potential or else drops in excitation thereby 
introducing the lower levels of operation. Yet this branching is not a 
disjunction because even the ma-rig-pa associated with the falling off still is 
connected with the dynamics of Being. There is no fall from grace or 
ultimate estrangement. The possibility of accessing the fuUest potential of 
Being is always present, if only in a dim or obscured manner. 
While the Yogacara formulation, with its emphasis on cognitive 
operations. iHustrates how this going astray deployment of experience 
actualizes itself. there remains the problem of how freedom in operation is 
possible. In rDzogs-chen thinking originary awareness. as a function of 
cognitive excitation. was understood as Being's abidingness in its 
primordiality. It is the actual energy of the thrust towards Being-in-its­
beingness. 
C) Mentation as Stepped Down FuocUooina 
The development of the understanding of ~ has illustrated the 
movement from the relatively primitive notion of mind as an entity amongst 
others. to a view of mental processing as a dynamic feedback/feedforward 
operation. to finally a recovery/discovery of the open dynamics of 
experience. As noted by Yogacira thinkers, experience may take two 
directions. On one hand "experience" (~) may enter into increasingly 
hardened form of the subject/object duality accompanied by the tendency to 
posit objects and the attendant emotional attachments resulting from 
desiring or avoiding these "objects". On the other hand, experience can 
"traver in a "direction" in which the openness of experience is directly 
encountered and freedom from the constraints of the actional domain of 
samsaric involvement is spontaneously present. 
The Sanskrit texts used the same term "mtA" for both directional 
deployments of experience. Here the Tibetan Buddhist thinkers advanced 
beyond the Indian traditions by clearly distinguishing these aspects and 
fully exploring the implications this distinction raises. To anticipate the 
discussion that will follow we can note that early Tibetan thinkers translated 
citta according to its context as ~ or sems-nvid. the nvid particle 
emphasizing the processing of ~, almost as a "experience- itself" before 
the openness has congealed into the naturalistic attitude. Sems-nyid can be 
used interchangeably with rig-oa. which we have provisionally translated as 
excitatory intelligence. Thus the Sems-nyid ngal-gso of Klong-chen rab­
'byams-pa uses the term sems-nyid to contrast with ~ (ordinary 
mentation) while the Yon-tan mdzod of 'jigs-med gling-pa, which is modelled 
largely after the Sems-nyid ngal-gso. uses the term rig-pa instead. 
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Three verses of the Yon-tan mdzod distinguish mentation (se.m.s) from 
excitatory intelligence (rig-pa), First we shall discuss these terms 
individually and then show in the next chapter how they form a 
complementary pair, pointing to a fundamental instability phase indicating 
the dynamics of being. The primary verses of the Yon-tan mdzod 
distinguishing ~ and rig-pa are:9S 
What is the essence of the rDzogs-chen distinction 
That excitatory intelligence surpasses ordinary mentation. 
For those who understand, excitatory intelligence is free in its 
operation 
Those ,vho do not, remain mentation governed in the cycles of 
samsara. 
Separating these aspects is like water and its bubbles, 
In as much as these cannot be divided in the least, ordinary 
mentation and excitatory intelligence are similar. 
Excitatory intelligence is not anything you can point to, all 
boundaries are gone, 
Ordinary mentation is murky like water swirling in a ravine. 
Excitatory intelHgence radiates from the depths like the full 
moon. 
Ordinary mentation is like the crescent moon covered in 
shadows. 
The creative potential of excitatory intelligence, clear of 
objective referents, 
Is distinct from ordinary mentation which is thoroughly bound 
up with the objective domain. 
Having given a general account of how rDzogs-chen thinking 
encompassed and yet went beyond the more well-known Buddhist 
philosophical systems, we can proceed to giving a fuller account of what is 
meant by mentation. The root of mentation is referred to as ma-rig-pa. a 
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term that is not a negation of excitatory intelligence (rii-ca). but rather a 
qualification of this intelligence such that we might say that excitatory 
intelligence is not at its fullest potential. Alternatively we might say that 
ma-rig-pa refers to a drop in the excitation of cognition. Already it is obvious 
that mentation and excitatory intelligence are not separate processes but 
rather that they are connected in such a way that we might speak of the 
pervasiveness of intelligence throughout the universe of experience. 
However the full potential of excitatory intelligence becomes obscured such 
that a collapse occurs into the habituated noetic\noematic complex, and a 
further reduction of the openness of experience into the solidification of the 
ego-centric demanding of subjectivity and into what are taken as the 
"objects" that are assumed to have independent existence. As Yon-tan rgya­
mtsho stated: 
As to that which is called "mentation", it is 
an appropriating activity due to various 
habitual tendencies, which from out of the 
radiant cognitivity of excitatory intelligence 
constructs models. From this arises the 
grasping and soliciting poles of experience 
and the elicited project. From this 
elicitation, although it is nothing objective in 
itself, comes the radiant pres,encing of form, 
sound, smell, odour, and touch. 
From the apprehending aspect of mentation, stated Yon-tan rgya mtsho, 
"comes the presencing of karma and the maturation of emotion obscurations 
beyond measure",96 
Mentation as a process is summed up as the eightfold (cognitive) 
ensemble Ushogs-brgyad). The first member is termed "the all-ground 
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tending toward cognitive operations" (kUD-izhi'j rDam-oar shes-oa) and
indicates a directionality towards particular cognitive operations or
judgments that arise out of the indeterminate substratum or all-ground
(kun-gzhil. The indeterminate substratum constitutes the totality of
inherited programs, or sedimented tendencies (bag-chags) which, when
suitably stimulated produce distinct cognitive/emotional situations.97
According to the rDzogs-chen conception there is a distinction between 
the kun-gzhi "the aU-ground" and the kun- gzhi rnam-par shes-pal as the 
"all-ground tending towards cognitive operations". This is an important 
distinction that further illustrates advances of rDzogs-chen thinking over the 
. Yogicira system. While the all-ground tending towards cognitive operations 
describes how the cognitive operations of mentation are set up and 
maintained, it fails to account for the Buddhist contention that a fuller sense 
of being, unlimited by the boundaries of discursive thinking, is also 
available. For rDzogs-chen thinkers the all-ground is always available and 
even underlies or provides the ground for both going astray into the dullness 
of everyday concern as well as providing the opportunity to recover the 
openness and freshness of experiencing. 
The second member of the eightfold cognitive ensemble can be termed 
the "ego-logical consciousness" (yid-kyi rnam-par shes-pal and is involved 
with making particular cognitive judgments. The cognitive ensemble 
accounts for a movement from the general stirring of the cognitive potential 
towards more specific cognitive judgments and situations. The third 
operation is the "emotionally tainted ego-centric consciousness" (nyan-yid or 
thenyon-mongs-pa'i yid-kyi rnam-par shes-pal, which refers to fact that 
operations, as intentional. refer back to a subjective pole that takes a 
particular interest in what is taking place. This subjective pole is, for the 
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Buddhist. an event rather than a persisting entity or central organization. 
This interest is emotionally tainted because it refers back to an "ego" that 
takes up a particular interest in projects in terms of whether they arouse 
aversion, desire or even indifference. The remaining five of the eight 
members of this ensemble are related to the sensory capacities (smell, touch, 
hearing. sight and taste), which are co-ordinated with their functions and 
their sensory domains. Out of this, perceptual datum (rnam-oa), literally 
that which has determinate aspects or "looks", are singled out. Sems is 
basically a process/product term for a self-organizing cognitive system that 
may be looked at as either a process in operation or summed up as a product 
of its own evolution.98 While these processes have been termed cognitive, 
experience in the Buddhist context is always "embodied" experience. This is 
readily apparent in the earlier chapters of the Yon-tan mdzod where it is 
shown how the obscuration of cognitive excitation leads not just into faulty 
judgments but into a whole life- style.99 These various "life-styles" are 
fully described under the tag of the six kinds of living beings and are 
important in terms of the psychological insight they provide. The emphasis 
on embodied experience can also be seen in the often fantastical accounts of 
the various "hells". These "hells" are not so much concrete experiences as 
metaphorical presentations of various embodied life-worlds. 
This description of the eightfold cognitive ensemble should not be 
seen as a structural account of the lived content of phenomenological 
consciousness. rDzogs-chen texts emphasized that there is no final product 
or structure, instead only the ongoing process of straying into fictions and 
moving away from the dynamic source and centre. This dynamic source is 
described as a radiant openness or open radiance (snang-stong), which 
present the paradox of there being nothing as such and yet a presence or 
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lighting up (snang). In exIstential terms we might say that samsara Is a kind 
of alienation in which a person is trapped in fictions of his own making and 
has lost the source of his freedom. Samsara is not a miserable end-product 
or even a state of unhappiness but rather an on-going deployment of 
experience in which a person is figuratively said to be carried away. The 
Sanskrit term samsara, which has become a part of our language, literally 
means 'to go round and round", The image of a constantly spinning wheel is 
freq uently used when referring to this frustrating and ultimately unhappy 
condition. However unlike the resigned pessimism in the "existential mood", 
Buddhist thinkers realized life is not a finished product nor a completed act 
but rather, life presents a constantly changing set of problems, Individuals 
can either react instinctually and mechanically or mobilize critical, 
appreciative acumen (shes rab:[prajni in Sanskrit)) and through appropriate 
activity (thabs:[upaya in Sanskrit)) transcend their limit-cycles and emerge 
into new dimensions of~openness and freedom. 
While the experientially initiated traces of the natural attitude result 
in the opaque "structure" and habitual ways of relating to this intended 
world. there is also a possibility to recover the freshness of presencing 
before this patterning takes place. Thus emphasis is put on the possibility of 
attaining new and open noetic contexts and on the positive destruction of 
habituated tendencies. In this regard aesthetic experience is highly valued 
because of its possibility for revealing new and rich appreciative contexts. 
By implication, the rDzogs-chen concern with opening up the experiential 
field does not preclude constructive or model-building activities, instead it 
criticizes attempts to remain within these models. whatever they might be. 
David Bohm and F. David Peat have captured this idea in a modern context 
by suggesting that creative thinking involves a playfulness that dissolves the 
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habituated and rigidly held ideas of the tacit infrastructure of accepted 
knowledge and shows that rigidity is itself a false kind of play.! 00 
Some investigators have noted parallels between the crisis in the 
modern sciences in which the classical deterministic model of the world has 
been overthrown and the critical overthrowal of the solid world of everyday 
concern by Buddhist thinkers 101. The ordinary world commonly believed to 
be absolutely given is strikingly similar to the world of classical physics. We 
interact with "things" we are certain are "really there"! we look for simple 
and linear causal explanations. and fit every-/lthing" into the logic of 
either/or. true or false. It has been suggested that Buddhism or other 
Eastern ways of thinking show parallels to Quantum physics 102. Caution is 
in order here for as Nick Herbert emphasized. there are at this time at least 
eight viable models of "Quantum Realities", all predicting the same results 
and compatible with the mathematical formulations.l 03 Herbert suggests 
that the greatest unknown is the nature of consciousness. In a Quantum 
universe, consciousness itself is a quantum effect. If this is the case perhaps 
part of the problem of integrating the results of Quantum theory with our 
understanding of the world is that experience has consistently been treated 
as if it were determined within a classical physics universe, and anything 
that was outsid~ these boundaries was treated as suspect or at best as 
"merely" subjective. If we take what the Buddhists have to contribute 
seriously, opening up the field of experience that is free from the boundaries 
of the mechanistic world view may show that there is indeed an access to 
what Herbert called "Quantum knowledge". 104 
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Dl Excitatory InteJJjRence as InstabjJjty pojnt 
It is by coming face to face with excitatory intelligence (rig-pa) that 
the opportunity! path, and goal of realizing the full potential of being is 
present. As the Mu-tig phreng-ba, an important tantra for the rDzogs-chen 
tradition. states: 
The difference between ordinary mentation and excitatory 
intelligence 
is to be known by the wise.IOS 
'Jig5-med gHng-pa stated that a distinguishing feature of rDzogs-chen is that 
it shows how to directly encounter excitatory intelligence (rig-pa).l 06 
Conversely, rDzogs-chen also shows how not to get into the power of 
mentation. His commentary states: 
From the creative surging of Being's 
excitatory intelligence is the frolicking in 
which arises the external domain although 
there is nothing there to examine. This 
(arising) is also free from the grasping of the 
presencing as cognition and is not found as 
the internal domain of mind.? This is the 
dissolution of the subject/object dichotomy. 
Excitatory intelligence, which is nothing as 
such, is free in its reach and range from 
samsara after dissolving the emotional 
entanglements and kar mic involvement.l 07 
Yon-tan rgya-mtsho spoke of this experience as having reached a level 
where everything is completely gone. On this level the sedimented habits 
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that take experience to be something. whether this be an object. subject. 
entity or a mental process. dissolve. As noted previously! excitatory 
intelligence is described as being open, radiant and non-fabricated. To 
distinguish this level from the ordinary enframement of mentation, it is 
spoken of as the Kun-tu bzang-po realm, or as the gestalt of meaningfulness 
(chos-sku), We might then contrast embodied mentation (sems-can) with 
(sangs-rgyas), As Klong-chen-pa said: 
When everything, all the mistaken notions of the inner and 
outer damains, 
cannot be objectified, like the sky, one reaches the 
intentionality of the meaning-rich gestalt. 
to arrive where everything has gone, with nothing to come or 
go. 
One has reached the supreme home of the continuum of 
meaningfulness. 
a vortex of loving kindness! the Kun-tu bzang-po realm.• 08 
Those who do not understand the operations of excitatory intelligence. 
which is meaning itself not just something that "has" meaning, remain as 
sentient beings (literally those endowed with mentation [sems-canD. As 
Yon-tan rgya-mtsho stated: "from the all-ground arises the presencing in 
mind of the existents of the internal and external worlds. The grasping of 
the ego that is opposed to others, this is what is called a sentient being 
(sems-can)".l09 
While the mentation governed level is characterized as being held fast 
by the peg of mentation, with excitatory intelligence freedom is reached. 
This is not so much a freedom to or a freedom from but rather a freedom in 
operation. The dynamics of Being are described as free. Therefore freedom 
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is inherent in the recovery of the full dynamics of Beina. Indeed in a 
paradoxical sense it is the freedom of Being that allows for the loss of 
freedom described as an alienation from freedom in operation. 
The reality of openness is not constrained by the cognitive
domain.
This is the very energy of the radiance of actuality of openness.
Where excitatory intelligence resides, the domain of gestalt and
originary cognition.
Which are inseparable like the sun's energy and the sun. I 10
Excitatory intelligence for rDzogs-chen thinkers thus involves the 
possibility of optimization and freedom. How is this possibility present? One 
way of looking at this possibility might be to suggest that excitatory 
intelligence can be seen as an instability point allowing the possibility of 
evolution into new domains of operation. As the Mu-tig phreng-ba states: 
If one is separate from mentation,
(obscurations) dissipate and (positive
qualities) expand.
All the dross of embodiment is gone. I I I
As is further described in the Bla-rna yan-tig of Klong-chen-pa: 
(with mentation) excitatory intelligence is not clearly evident.
At the time when excitatory intelligence is there, mentation is
not visible.
At one moment this arises, at one movement it ceases. I 12
These are not two separate types of operation. Instead excitatory 
intelligence names the movement to a new level of operation in which the 
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dynamics of creative evolution are accessed and lived. On the level of 
mentation intelligence is reduced to the habitual operations that remain 
within particular parameters, while on the "higher" level of excitatory 
intelligence the dynamics are allowed full range and creative change is made 
possible. Excitatory intelligence is free in the sense that it allows this 
creative dynamiC to express itself. 
Excitatory intel1igence has also been characterized as the energy 
thrust toward optimization (bde-gshegs snying-po). As Klong-chen-pa 
stated: 
It is from the primordial radiance of the thrust towards 
optimization. 
Which is not fabricated: the ongoing actuality of what we really 
are, 
which is from the beginning thoroughly pure, like the sun in the 
sky.113 
Excitatory intelligence is not something added to the system nor is it merely 
a ~tay of surveying what is already there, but rather it is part of the 
dynamic of '\\o~hat for want of better term we call "Being" or "Universe". In 
this regard, Guenther has referred to rig-pa as the total system's (Being's) 
excitation. 114 
The conclusion that these are not two processes, but rather that the 
distinction between mentation and excitatory intelligence indicates recovery 
of the dynamics of being can also be shown in the examination of the various 
analogies and metaphors used to characterize this distinction. Both Yon-tan 
rgya-mtsho and 'jigs-med gling-pa compared excitatory intelligence to a 
state of affairs such that the great ocean of meaningfulness is not stirred up 
by the waves of diminished intelligence and the eightfold (cognitive) 
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ensemble. PerhaDs excitatory intelliience is beiIl2 comDared to the 
reflective. shining quality that water can have. much like a mirror, when not 
disturbed by the turbulence of waves. As Yon-tan rgya-mtsho emphasized, 
this is the way of the rDzogs-chen approach, which, by not interfering with 
what is naturally left to itself a free and ecstatic process, regains the 
wholeness of Being. Indeed this distinction between experience. as a 
shorthand term for mind or mentation. and experience itself before being 
filtered by the stirring of ingrained tendencies and the processing of the 
eightfold cognitive ensemble. is virtually identical to that of excitatory 
intelligence and mentation. For those who understand directly. the 
discursive conceptualization of mentation is described by way of analogy as 
being similar to drawing pictures on the water. Of course the water is 
unchanged by this. 
66
CHAPTER .POUR 
Sources of the Distinetion between Mentation and
Excitatory Intelligence
A) Earlier Formulations 
The importance of distinguishing mentation (~.m.sJ from excitatory 
intelligence (rig-pa) can be traced back to the earliest periods of rDzogs-chen 
thinking. The history of the rDzogs-chen teaching is at best sketchy and 
affixing dates and authorship to many of the key texts, especially the early 
tantras of the rDzogs-chen tradition, is impossible. Nevertheless we can 
point to references from what are regarded as the earliest and most central 
of the rDzogs-chen tantras showing the distinction between mentation and 
excitatory intelligence. One of the most authoritative accounts of this 
distinction is given by the fourteenth century author, Klong-chen rab­
'byams-pa who, because of his insight and originality, is considered the 
foremost thinker of the tradition. In his Bla-ma yang-tig. Klong-chen rab­
'byams-pa presented a summary of the key ideas used to distinguish 
mentation from excitatory intelligence. The use of these terms by 'jigs-med 
gling-pa and Yon-tan rgya-mtsho is thus seen as maintaining a long­
established tradition. The twelve contrasts summarized by Klong-chen rab­
'byams-pa are listed below and are followed by a brief explanatory 
com ment.11 S 
67 
1. The facticity of mentation is dim ming of cognitive 
excitation (ma-rig-pa). The facticity of excitatory 
intelligence is pristine cognitiveness (ye-shes). 
As previously stated, the facticity of mentation is ma-rig- Pil. which is not 
the negation or absence of cognitive excitation but only its dimming or 
collapsed state. Contrasted with this diminished cognitive energy is what is 
termed "pristine cognitiveness". This term can also be used in the plural as 
"pristine cognitions" and is composed of two roots; "shes-pa", which denotes 
. cognition or the activity of knowing, and "~", which means beginning, 
however, in this context it refers to a beginning which is not "within" some 
temporal sequence, but outside temporality. Since Being, as conceived of in 
rDzogs-chen thinking, is not something that can occur "in" time - rather Being 
encompasses temporality, and only individual, antic "entities" can be said to 
have beginning or end - the underlying dynamics of Being are described as 
"atemporal". In more concrete terms we might say that atemporal 
cognitiveness indicates a cognitive process in which instead of merely 
repeating habituated tendencies of experiencing, every "cognition" is fresh 
and new. 116 This term indicates a return or recovery of experience in its 
original purity before it is overlaid with incidental grime or split up into the 
subjective apprehending of an apprehendable object. 
2. The facticity of mentation is connection with karma and 
habituated tendencies (bag-chags). The facticity of 
excitatory intelligence is non-connection with karma and 
habituated tendencies. 
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3. The faeticity of mentation is the essence of mistaken 
identification ('khrul-pa) and the subject/object duality 
(gzung-'dzin). The facticity of excitatory intelligence is 
the actuality of not going in for mistaken identification 
and having nothing to do with the duality of subject and 
object. 
Bt)th pairs t)f oontrasts have already been dIscussed in earlier sections 
dealing with mentation. By ~lay of clarification it should be added that the 
term "karma", although it has become an accepted part of our vocabulary, 
actually has nothing to do with "destiny", Karma refers to what might be 
caUed the "actional domain" in which actions are both the momentu m and 
modifiers, and in this regard, both the "cause" and "result" of the 
predicaments we find ourselves in. This has been brought out in the fourth 
chapter of the Yon-tan mdzod. 
4. The facticity of mentation is the limits of the thematic 
horizon (spros). The facticity of excitatory intelligence is 
separate from the whole thematic horizon. 
In the fourth contrast, excitatory intelligence is said to be disconnected from 
the intellectual or thematic horizon (~). Mentation, on the other hand, 
might be said to comprise this horizon with its in-built limitations. 
lVlentation operates with what can be thematized, talked about, and 
structured into the familiar pattern of the apprehended world. 'Jigs-med 
gHng- pa pointed to four limits (mu-bzhf) that are characteristic of 
intellectual judgments.117 These consist of four pairs of alternatives 
including: coming into existence/ceasing (skye- 'gag); eternalism/nihilism 
(rtag-chad); existence/non-existence (yod-med) and presencing/emptiness 
(snang-stong). The alternatives presented in these four pairs are all 
69 
intellectual judiments that are rejected as beini cateiories of oDeration 
performed by mentation, which force an even more solid rigidification of 
what mind takes to be the real world. It is no trite comment to insist that 
what we point to as "reality" or refer to in philosophical terms as "Being" 
cannot be reduced to the models we make. This is not to suggest that 
rDzogs-chen thinkers rejected the thematic aspect of experience. instead 
they saw conventional. thematic thinking (kun-rdzob) and the ultimately 
valid (don-dam) as inseparable. According to Guenther, the inseparability of 
these "two modes of accessing" is due: 
to the self-structuring process of Reality-as­
such, whose expressive immediacy is that 
fundamental concern that comes to the fore 
as encounters with the inexhaustible source 
of possibilities of meaning. thereby 
prompting and engendering interpretive 
responses.lt8 
These two reality modes have been discussed in the introduction. 
5. The facticity of mentation is the stratum of all things 
(kyn-gzhi) and the eightfold cognitive ensemble (tshogs­
brgyag). The facticity of excitatory intelligence is beyond 
the stratum of all things and the eightfold cognitive 
ensemble. 
The fifth pair of contrasts has already been discussed in the section on 
mentation. 'jigs-med gling-pa described excitatory intelligence as "not 
stirring up the waves of the eightfold cognitive ensemble". 119 
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6. The facticity of mentation is chasing of duality of samsara 
('thor-ba). The facticity of excitatory intelligence is the 
non-duality of nirvana (myan-'das). 
The sixth contrast contains two of the most well-known Buddhist terms. 
Excitatory int~lligence is "being beyond suffering and frustration" (mya­
ngan-las 'das-pa or myaog-'das as it IS abbreviated), which is the translation 
of the Tibetan term for the Sanskrit "nirvana". Samsara, translated into 
Tibetan as ('khor-ba) means to go around in circles, which refers to being 
stuck in the uncomprehending repetition of habituated tendencies and 
rushing headlong from one situation into another. Nirvana is referred to as 
non-dual indicating that the splitting of the wholeness of experience by 
mentation does not obtain. Indeed the definition of a sentient being (sems­
gn'f literally one who has ~ could be interpreted as one who is 
mentation governed. Both 'jigs-med gling-pa and Yon-tan rgya-mtsho 
compared the sUbject\object dichotomy of mentation to a stake (rtod-bur) 
that restrains the open operation of excitatory intelligence. Thus the 
distinction between a ordinary sentient being (sems-can or Ius-can [an 
embodied being)) and a "buddha" (sangs-rgyas) is not between two different 
classes of beings. Instead in the dissipation of obstacle (sangs) and the 
expansion (rgyas) of all that is positive, the restraining 'stake' of mentation is 
removed and the openness of the dynamic process of Being re-establishes 
itself. As 'jigs-med gling-pa stated in quoting the Mu-tig phreng-ba: 
If there is a disconnection from mentation, 
obscurrations dissipate and positivity 
expands (sangs-rgyas-Pi). All the dross of 
embodied being is gone. 120 
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The underlying dynamics that connect excitatory intelligence and mentation 
are further indicated in the seventh of the twelve contrasts. 
7, The faeticity of mentation is the outward directed glow of 
excitatory intelligence (rig-gdangs) being carried away by 
karmic motility (las-rlung). The facticity of excitatory 
intelligence is an auto-radiance I not carried away or 
coming or going. 
The outwardly directed glow of excitatory intelligence is an important and 
unique contribution of rDzogs-chen thinking. In brief we can describe 
'motility' (d.ung) as energetic currents, which are both physical and psychic. 
'NIotiHty' can operate as the motility that is karmic action (las-rlung) 
associated with the conventional level (kun-rdzob) or as (ye-shes-kyi clung), 
.motility that is pristine cognitiveness I on the level of the ultimately valid 
(don-dam).l21 
8. The racticity of mentation is a put up job ('dus-byas) 
which is in the power of modifiers (ckyen). The facticity 
of excitatory intelligence is not fabricated or modified. 
The term 'dus-byas indicates that which has been put together or 
constructed. In the Buddhist context. samsara is just this 'put-up job' which 
under the power of modifiers, undergoes change and may collapse at any 
moment. In contrast to the divisive conceptualizing of mentation, which 
divides up the wholeness of experience into the duality of subject and object. 
excitatory intelligence is not something adulterated. Indeed we might say 
that mentation is the messing up of the openness and radiance of excitatory 
intelligence. 
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9. The faeticity of mentation is seen in relation to excitatory 
intelligence. The facticity of excitatory intelligence 
cannot be seen from the viewpoint of mentation. 
In modern terms we might say that the lower level is seen in relation to the 
higher one, but that the operations of a higher level cannot be reduced to the 
lower level. 
10. The faeticity of mentation is a coming into presence 
(snang-ba) which seems to have an onset (~) and 
ending (~). The facticity of excitatory intelligence 
does not change into something else (jillQ) or transform 
(nw:). 
This contrast indicates a general movement in rDzogs-chen thinking away 
from thinking in terms of entities, which seem to belong within a temporal 
sequence, that is, they come "into" existence at some point and pass "out" of 
existence at another. Buddhist thinkers also rejected the idea of an centre, 
whether this is conceived of as an individual "ego" or a universal atman that 
persists throughout transformation and changes. 
11. The facticity of mentation is an obscuration (mtib) that 
must be wiped out. The facticity of excitatory 
intelligence is the pristine cognitiveness (ye-shes) to be 
reached. 
This contrast has already been discussed in Chapter Three. 
12. The facticity of mentation is an incidental straying into 
divisive conceptualization. The fac!icity of excitatory 
intelligence is the primordial meaning-saturated gestalt. 
13 
While mentation is the deviation of intelligence that becomes trapped in 
divisive conceptualization, excitatory intelligence operates in the gestalt of 
meanings. The primordiality of the meaning-saturated gestalt can be 
delineated as the insistence on the primacy of meaning-seeking as 
contrasted with the domain of "entities" and "meanings". In this sense the 
meaning-saturated gestalt is primordial because it predates the particular 
meaning and events that are dealt with on the level of mentation. 
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B) Translation from the Commentary to the Yon-tan Mdzod 
To conclude this study we shall translate a portion of the commentary 
by Yon-tan rgya-mtsho on the pertinent verses of 'jigs-med gling-pa's YQn.:. 
tan mdwd distinguishing mentation (~) from excitatory intelligence (d&:: 
n.a.l. 122 The root verses or the Yon-tan mdzod have already been translated 
in Chapter One of the present study. As well as helping to explicate this 
distinction, the translation also serves to display the structure and nature of 
indigenous Tibetan commentaries. Yon-tan rgya-mtsho's commentary is 
structured such that it incorporates the root verses of the Yon-tan mdzod 
one or more "words"123 at a time. To indicate this feature in the 
translation. we have bold-faced the "words" from the original verses as they 
occur in the commentary. 
In conclusion we can note that the great debt both Yon-tan rgya­
mtsho and jigs-med gling-pa owe to earlier thinkers is evident in the 
passage to be translated. Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa's summary dates back 
to the 14th century, but many of these same ideas are present in the early 
tantras of the rNying-ma tradition. It is beyond the scope of the present 
work to determine the earliest presentation of these key ideas. This 
undertaking would involve a critical reading of the earliest writings of the 
rDzogs-chen tradition and in particular the as yet little studied tantras of the 
rDzogs-chen tradition. For the purposes here we can note the indebtedness 
of later writers to the germinal insights of the earlier period. In addition we 
can suggest that further research into the early rDzogs-chen tantras. which 
have had not even the benefit of a critical edition, is essential for 
understanding the unique contributions of Tibetan thinkers. 
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The Translation 
First an explanation of the meaning of the distinction between 
excitatory intelligence and mentation. 124 
"Those" referred to are said to already fully understand (rtogs-pa). 
"Not understanding" means one hastens after duality. As to that termed 
"mentation" (g.m..SJ. it is a fabricated aspect of the cognitivity of excitatory 
intelligence (rig-pa). which is lucent (gnl), involving a subjective grasping 
Cdzin). through the activation of various experientially initiated programs of 
experience (bag-chags). From this arises the particular aspects of the 
SUbject/object duality (gzung-ldzin). Further, from the projects which elicit 
mentation, although there is nothing objectively there as a project, lucent 
presencing is taken as the presencing of the five fields of form, sound, smell, 
flavor and rapport. From the SUbjective grasping of mentation comes the 
presencing of karma and the maturation of innumerable emotional 
obscurations. 
EIcitatory intelligence is disconnected from this, open (1l:Qng), 
lucent (gglJ and not contrived (dus-ma-byas), in reach and range like the 
sky, completely beyond the misery of samsara, it abides in the manner of 
auto-effulgence which never ceases. From the Yid-bzhin rin-po-che'i 
mdzQd·125 
The thrust towards optimization126 I from the timeless 
beginning a sheer lucency ('od-gsal), 
the very meaningfulness of the ground (don-gyi kun-gzhi), its 
actuality is not contrived, 
primordially pure in every aspeet.1ike the sun in the sky. 
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Thus bringing one face to face with excitatory intelligence is the 
distinguishing feature of the essence of rDzogs-chen (complete 
wholeness), for those who understand the mode of excitatory 
intelligence of the internal logic of Being (chos-nyid) the external objective 
domain. which cannot wIthstand Investigation appears at that time as the 
frolicking of the creativity of excitatory intelligence. One is free from the 
subjective grasping of cognitivity, which is taken as the internality of mind. 
The teacher of the subject/object duality is toppled. One is free in the reach 
and range of eIcitatory intelligence, which is not something as such, from 
the totality of conditioned existence after karma and emotional obscurations 
have been dissolved. One has reached the level of the internal logic of Being 
where everything is over. This is what is said to be reaching in one's own 
lifetime the dynamic continuum of meaning as an informing hierarch (rgyal­
no), the domain of Kun-tu bzang-po. From the Chos-dbying rin-po-che'i 
mdzod: 127 
When everything, all the mistaken notions of the inner and 
outer domains, 
cannot be objectified, like the sky, one reaches the 
intentionality of the meaning-rich gestalt. 
to arrive where everything has gone, with nothing to come or 
go, 
One has reached the supreme home of the continuum of 
meaningfulness, 
a vortex of loving kindness, the Kun-tu bzang-po realm. 
17 
Those who do not understand the excitatory intelli2ence of the internal 
logic of Being, through the arising from the all-ground (kun-gzhi) comes the 
presencing of the various "concrete things" which are seen to be the internal 
and the external, including mentation. That which is termed "sentient 
being!' (sems-can) is the taking up of "self'! and "other", Although there is 
no moving away from just this, the field of excitatory intelligence, it 
becomes through the all-ground, the realm of samsara. From the rTsal­
rdzogs: 128 
The un-knowing fools of this realm try urgently to tie knots in 
the sky. 
Taking up presencing, which is not an objective presence, 
they grasp as "self" and "other", that which does not exist as 
"self" and "other". 
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V. FOOTNOTES
I The full title is Yon-tan rjn-oo-che'j mdzod dga'-ba'i char. This text 
is found in The Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen 'jigs-med gling-oa, 
(Gangtok: Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab, vol. 30, 1971). 
2 This study, available only in German, is: Die aus dem Chinesischen 
Ubersetzten Tibetischen Versionen des Suvar\laprabhisastltra, by 
Claus oetke, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag) 1977). 
3 Tucci. Tibetan painted ScroUs. p. 97. 
4 Historical information is based upon Tucci's The Religions of Tibet 
and on the preface by E. Gene Smith to The Autobiographical 
Reminiscences of Ngag-dbang-dpal-bzang, (Gangtok: Ngagyur 
Nyingmay Sungrab, vol. 1, 1969). For a critical discussion of early 
Buddhism in Tibet that challenges the "official" account see "Early 
Forms of Tibetan Buddhism!! by H.V. Guenther in Crystal Mirror, 
voL3. 
5 Guenther, H.V., "Early Forms of Tibetan Buddhism" in Crystal Mirror. 
vol. III (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1974), pp.80-92. 
6 Dargyay, Eva, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet. 
7 A good introduction to the development of rNying-ma tradition is 
found in the preface by E. Gene Smith to The Autobiographical 
Reminiscences of Ngag-dbang-dpal-bzang. (Gangtok: Ngagyur 
Nyingmay Sungrab, Volume 1, 1969). 
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8 See the account by Samten Gyaltsen Karmay in his PhD. thesis 
entitled Origin and Early Development of the Tibetan Religious 
Traditions of the Great Perfection (rDzogs-Chen), School of Oriental 
and African Studies, The University of London, 1987. 
9 For an account of the development of major trends in Buddhist 
thinking from early schools of Buddhism to the advances of the 
rDzogs-chen school see Guenther, From Reductionism to Creativity: 
rDzogs-chen and the New Sciences of Mind. (New Science Library, 
Shambhala Publications, in press). This study traces the evolution 
of Buddhist thinking in terms of the developmental pathways and 
instability phases culminating in the rDzogs-chen tradition. 
10 See Guenther, "The Old and the New Vision" in Erich Jantsch, ed. 
The Evolutionary Vision: TO~lard a Unifying Paradigm of Physical. 
Biological and Socioculturll Evolution. Boulder, Colorado: AAAS 
Selected Symposium 61, 1982. 
11 This analogy has been suggested by Guenther, 1984. For more on 
dissipative structure see Prigogine and Stengers Order Out of 
Chaos (Bantam Books; Toronto, 1984). 
12 This concern can be readily shown by the titles of the five earliest 
translation of rDzogs-chen (rDzogs chen snga 'gyur lnga): 
Byang chub sems bsgom pa 
Byang chub sems rtsa! chen sprugs pa 
Byang chub sems rig pa khu byug 
Byang chub sems khyung chen 
Byang chub sems mi nub pa'i rgyud mthsan 
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For an account of these texts along with a translation of the first work, 
see Primordial Experience translated by Namkhai Norbu and 
Kennard Lipman. 
13 For example see Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist 
Philosophy. p.21 or A.K. Warder's Indian Buddhism. p.94. 
14 rDzQgs pa chen po nges don 'dus pa'i rgyud by Vimalamitra, from 
the collection rNying-ma'i rgyud-'bum. Thimbu, 1973, Vo1.7 pp.1­
108. 
15 Guenther, Matrix of Mystery. p.209, note 1. 
16 Schrag, Calvin 0., Experience and Being. p. 230. 
17 Unfortunately little is known about Yon-tan rgya-mtsho, also 
kno,vn by the name Mkhan-po Yon-dga'. According to the 
introduction to the Yon-tan rin-po-che'j mdzod-kyi 'grel-pa nyi­
zla'i sgron-me. Yon-tan rgya-mtsho was a slightly senior 
contemporary to Gzhan-phan-chos-kyi-snang-ba or GZhan-dga' 
(1871- 1927). This would place him in the latter half of the 19th 
century. We also know that he studied with dPal-sprul O-rgyan­
'jigs-med-chos-kyi-dbang-pa (also known as dPal-sprul, born 
1808). 
18 The full title is Yon-tan rin-po-che'i mdzod dga'-ba'i char. This text 
is found in The Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen 'Jigs-med gHng-pa, 
(Gangtok: Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab, vol. 30, 1971). 'Jigs-med 
gling-pa also wrote a two volume commentary on this root text, the 
Bden-gnyis shing-rta. (A commentary on Chapters 1- 9 of the YQn.:. 
tan mdzod) and the rNam-mkhyen shing-rta (A commentary on 
Chapters 10 - 13). Both commentaries can be found in The 
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Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen 'Jigs-med gling-pa, (Gangtok: 
Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab, vols. 29 & 3D, 1971). 
19 dPal-sprul O-rgyan 'jigs-med chos kyi dbang-po Yon-tan mdzod 
kyi spyi-don sa-bead rgyas bsdus mtshams-ba 'bring-po !tar byas­
~ in his The Collected Works of dPal-sprul. vol. 2. 
20 JHistorical information is drawn from Eva Dargyay's The Rise of Esoteric 
Buddhism in Tibet. as well as from Sonam T. Kazi's introduction to the 
Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab Series, Volume 26, 
21 A translation and commentary on the Sems-nyid Ngal-gso has been 
written by Guenther entitled Kindly Bent to Ease Us. part One: Mind 
(Dharma Publishing; Emeryville, California. 1975). 
22 See for example Steiner, George After Babel (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), 
23 Afull account of the "fore-structure" of interpretation occurs in 
lVlartin Heidegger's Being and Time, pp, 188-195, in which 
Heidegger argues that an interpretation "is never a 
presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" 
(pp.l91-192), Rather interpretation is always grounded in a) ~
haying - interpretation occurs within a totality of involvements. b) 
fore-sight - that which makes the distinction within what we have 
in advance with a view towards a definite way in which this can be 
interpreted, and c) fore-conception - which "has already decided 
for a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with 
reservation,tt( p191 ) 
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24 It must be noted here that Heidegger's later thinking somewhat 
challenges this earlier formulation by suggesting that every 
"granting" of Being is in the same way a concealing, in the sense 
that Being is taken in a way which bars others. In this regard we 
can may see how Heidegger's later thinking touches on the 
"mystery" of Being. As Kockelmans states: "(Being).. .is that which 
hides itself when it grants itself such that beings may be what they 
are in truth", On the Truth of Being, p. 48 
2S Heidegger, Being and Time. p.195. 
26 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method. 
27 Gadamer, Truth and Method. p. 350. 
28 This was first stressed by F.S.C. Northrop in The Meeting of East 
and West. 
29 Warder, A.le., Indian Buddhism, p.36. 
30 For a discussion of the problem of empiricism in the context of 
western philosophy see "Empiricism" by D. W. Hamlyn in IM 
Encyclopedia of Philo§ophy edited by Paul Edwards (New York: 
Macmillan PUblishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press), pp.499 - 505. 
31 Northrop, F,S.C., The Meeting of East and West. 
32 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutic§, p. 102. 
33 Ricoeur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 11 S. 
34 Heidegger, Identity and Difference. p. 23. 
35 Gilbert Ryles's The Concept of Mind. which draws on and develops 
the linguistic philosophy of LUdwig Wittgenstein, is perhaps the 
most widely acknowledged philosophical critique of the manifold 
problems associated with the concept of mind. On the 
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psychological side, ].Z. Young in Programs of the Brain (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978) admits that "("mind") ...is really at 
best a vague concept", p.216. 
36 Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice, p. 13. 
37 According to the Yid-bzhin-mdzod-kyi grub-mtha' bsdus-pa (p. 
951 ff.) by Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho (a 
summary of philosophical views as presented in kLong-chen rab­
'byams-pa's Yid-bzhin rin-po-chelj mdzod), the Vaibhi~ikas
grouped the knowable (shes-bya) under five headings: 
i. What we would consider the physical-material but which is 
strictly speaking form or pattern (as in a coloured patch). Here the 
four elementary functions of solidity, cohesion, temperature and 
movements as cause give rise to the five senses on one side and 
the five sense objects on the other. 
ii. Mind (~).
iii. Mental events (sems-byung) including the five ever-present 
events, five object determined functions, eleven positive functions 
that aid one in understanding, six basic emotions that throw 
one off track, twenty subsidiary emotions that continue this 
deviation, and four variables of mental functioning. 
iv. Twenty three entities that do not fit into either the mental or 
formal categories, including such diverse topics as force, letters, 
transitoriness. 
v. The three persisting elements (absolutes), 
See the translation of this text in Buddhist Philosophy in Theory 
and Practice. 
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38 Yid-bzhin-mdzod-kyi grub-mtha' bsdus-pa by Mi-pham 'jam­
dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho, p.95 1. 
39 See Guenther. Buddhist Philosophy In Theory and Practice 
(Penguin Books; Baltimore. 1972). p. 36. 
40 Afull account of mind and mental events is found in Guenther. 
Herbert V. and Kawamura. Leslie S.. Mind in Buddhist Psychology. 
(Dharma Publishing: Emeryville. California, 1975). 
41 Yid-bzhin-mdzQd-kyi grub-mtha l bsdus-pa. p. 952. 
42 Abhidharmako§a. II. verse 23. Tibetan translation. 
43 As Louis de La Vallee Poussin reports: 
La pensee est nommee ~ parce qu1elle 
accumule (cinoti); elle set nommee manas 
parce qU'elle connait (manute); elle est 
nommee vijiilna parce qu'elle distingue son 
object (alambanam vijanati). 
L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu translated and annotated by 
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, (Institut Beige Des Etudes Chinoises; 
Bruxelles. 1971), p. 177. 
44 AbhidharmakoSa, II. 34a, 
45 GuentheL From Reductionism to Creativity: rDzogs-chen and the 
New Science of Mind (New Science Library, in press). 
46 For further details see Philosophy and psychology in the 
Abhidhilrma. Herbert V. Guenther (Shambhala Publications; 
Berkeley and London, 1976). 
47 Yid-bzhin-mdzod-kyi grub-mtha l bsdus-pa. p. 964. 
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48 For a discussion of the noetic and noematic aspects of experience 
in the context of the development of phenomenology see 
Experimental Phenomenology by Don Ihde (G.P. Putnam's SODS: 
Ne~Y York, 1977). 
49 Yon-tan rgya-mtsho, Yon-tan rin-po-che'i mdzod-kyi 'grel-pa zab­
don snang-byed nyi-ma'i 'od-zer (hereafter Nyi-ma'i 'od-zer), p. 
433. 
50 ~ferleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of perception, translated 
by Colin Smith (Routledge & ((egan Paul; London and Henly, 1962), 
pp.70-71. 
51 The Tibetan interpretation of the term kun-gzhi is a complex issue 
that could involve a major study alone. The rNying-ma 
interpretation is distinctly different from interpretations offered 
by other schools. On this issue, see Guenther's Buddhist Philosophy 
in Theory and Practice. In general the Sanskrit term Ilaya-vijfiana. 
when used in the Indian Yogacara schools, was interpretated as 
presenting the possiblity for a change in aspects (rnam -gyur) but 
not for a complete transformation (gnas- gyur ). To account for the 
transformation in which a new "Buddha- structure" was produced, 
the idea of amala-vijii'ina was produced. The term kun-gzhi as 
interpreted by rNying-ma and rDzogs-chen thinkers would 
incorporate the idea of amala- vijnina. which presents the 
possiblity of complete change in status, not merely in looks. 
52 Here used in Heidegger's sense of "prejudice". See Section "B) The 
Hermeneutic Approach" in the introductory chapter. 
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S3 Matson, Wallace, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?" in 
Mind. Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in 
Honor of Herbert Feigl. ed. Paul Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell 
(Minneapolis l 1966) pp.92-1 02. 
54 See Clapp) James Gordon, "Locke" in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosopby. edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillian 
Publishing Co., Inc, & The Free Press) 1967). 
S5 Descartes, Descartes' Philosophical Writings, Selected and 
translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillian & Co. Ltd., 
1952)1 p.129. 
56 Fora critique see Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
57 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. p. 6. 
58 For an overview of modern work in this area with an account of 
the "hermeneutic" approach see "Studying Cognition Today" by 
Daniel Andler in Eidos. Vol. 5, No.2, December, 1986. For the 
relationship between the "hermeneutic" approach and the 
philosophical approach termed "hermeneutic" see "Experimental 
Epistemology: Background and Future" by Francisco J. Varela, in the 
same volume of~.
59 Dasgupta, Surendranath A History of Indian Philosopby, Volume I. 
p.75. 
60 Maturana, Humberto and Varela, Francisco, The Tree of 
Knowledge (New Science Library; Boston and London, 1987). 
61 See Guenther, H.V., Buddhist Philosoohy in Theory and Practice, 
Chapter IV. 
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62 See Lipman. K., "The Cittamatra and its Madhyamika critique: 
Some phenomenological reflections" in Philosophy East and West, 
32, no.3 (july. 1982). 
63 For the purposes of our analysis we will over look the fact that the 
Madhyamika school has at least two important sub- divisions: the 
Svatantrikas and the Prasangikas. 
64 The term "dependent co-origination" is taken from Frederick 
Streng's Emptiness. See Chapter Four of this work for a detailed 
account of this explanatory principle. 
65 Nyi-ma'i ·od-zer. p. 20. 
66 What "~le have termed the "model-building" (kun-rdzob). can also 
be termed the "conventionally accepted". One translation, "model­
building". stresses the creative side of this activity which produces 
models and procedures to identify and co-ordinate various 
projects. The other, "conventionally accepted". stresses the fact 
that these models (or perhaps "language games") have a 
consensually validated status and are only provisional or relative 
to particular projects. 
67 See Guenther. The Creative Vision. pp. viii-xiv. 
68 Yon-tan mdzod. Chapter 12. p. 101. 
69 Bodhicaryavatara. chapter nine, verse two. 
70 Nyi-ma'i 'od-zer. p.20. 
71 Haberlin, Paul, Phi!osophia Perennis. (Berlin: Springer- Verlag, 
1952). This work has, by some oversight, not been translated into 
English. I have relied on the impromptu translation of Dr. 
Guenther. 
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72 Since ontological difference is a theme expressed in many 
variations throughout Heidegger's work. any account of his 
"results" that can be useful for our purposes here must necessarily 
be a generalization and simplification of a whole path of thinking. 
For a general discussion of "ontological difference" as it figures in 
the course of Heidegger's thinking see. L.M. Vail Heidegger and 
Ontological Difference (The Pennsylvania State University Press: 
University Park and London. 1972). 
73 See Matrix of Mystery. p.S. 
74 hiatrix of Mystery. p.198. 
75 See Harrison. Edward, Masks of the Universe. p. 1 ff. 
76 We have translated kun-gyi gzhi as "inclusive ground" not "ground 
of all" or "all-ground" since the term KYn has the implication of 
"totality" but not just in the sense of indicating all members of a set 
of objects or things. This latter sense would be indicated if instead 
of kun the term thams-cad. meaning everything, was used by 
rDzogs-chen thinkers. K.u.n has much more the association of 
"whole" or "nothing left out". 
77 For a full account of stong-gsal and the indivisibility of these 
notions. see Matrix of Myst~ry. pp. 48 - 54. 
78 Guenther, Matrix of Mystery. p.7ff. 
79 See Matrix of Mystery. pp.8 ff. For an account of the rDzogs-chen 
understanding of the dynamic processes of Being see also the 
papers by Herbert V. Guenther: "The Dynamics of Being: rDzogs­
chen Process Thinking" (Canadian Tibetan Studies vol. 1. Occasional 
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Names of Monasteries: 
Nylngmapa Kagyudpa 
1 Sllmye 10 Tshur-Phu 
2 Min·Trol.Ling 11 Ori·Gung 
3 Oor.Je·Trag 12 Den-Sa·Thil 
4 Ka·Thog 13 Dag·Lha Oam-Po 
5 PaJ-Yul 14 Pal·Pung 
6 Dzeg·Chen 15 RI·Wo·Che 
7 Zhe·Chen 16 ~ng·NS8g Cho.LingI 
t. 2 Docru? Ch~;:
9 Tarrhang Sakyapa 
17 ~kya
18 'Nor·E·Wam Cho·Den 
19 . be·Ge Cion·Chen 
(Lhun·Drup Teng) 
20 Dlong·~r
-F--"'/
Qelugpa 
21 Ciaden 28 Ra·Dreng 
22 Ore·Pung 29 Jo(M?") Nang 
zr Sera 
24 Tra·Shi Lhun·Po 
25 Chab·Do 
26 Ku·Bum 
27 Tra·Shl·Khyll· ~~
o 
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Figure 1. Buddhist monasteries in Tibet. (From Tulku Thondup, Buddhist 
Civilization in Tibet, Cambridge, U.S.A.: Maha Siddha Nyingmapa Center, 
1982). 
